US-led TPPA and Its Implication on China Positions in Southeast Asian Regionalism

Mohamed Aslam
1.798 326

Abstract


Prior to the development of ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN was the main architecture integrating countries in Southeast Asia. The organization was able to develop a closer economic cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea. However, China and Japan competing and attempting to “dictate” each other and what regionalism should be and whom it benefits. Small states such as the members of ASEAN and those skeptical of China’s motives in Southeast Asia including China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea would cling to the US. Political and economic development over the past 10 years reveal that the close allies of the United States of America (USA) such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, were unable to “limit” China’s growing domination in the Southeast Asian region. The TPPA that was allegedly “hijacked” and led by the US since November 2009, was believed as a counter measure to check China’s growing power in Southeast Asia. If the TPPA is not meant to limit China’s presence in the region, the agreement would function as a pathfinder for the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. This paper attempts to answer (i) what is the motive of the US government involvement in TPPA, (ii) what the posible implication of TPPA to China (iii) what would happen to China’s role in the region, and (iv) what insurance actions developed by China.

 


Keywords


Free trade area, trans-pacific partnerships agreement, United States of America, China, ASEAN and Southeast Asia

Full Text:

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21599/atjir.42674

References


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