

## The EU-Turkey refugee deal of autumn 2015 as a two-level game

Thomas Krumm\*

**Abstract:** *The Syrian refugee crisis has put EU-Turkey relations under pressure for action, as in 2015 hundreds of thousands used the Turkey-Balkan route to enter Western Europe. Against this background, the article aims to analyse the EU-Turkey negotiations of autumn 2015 as a 'two-level game', focussing especially on domestic factors in Turkey and Germany and their possible impact on their governments bargaining power. Specific domestic factors such as the controversial 'open-doors policy' of chancellor Merkel as well as the hung parliament in Turkey after the June elections are taken into consideration. The article then applies the basic logic of 'two level games' as introduced by Robert Putnam on the EU/German-Turkish negotiations leading up to the 'refugee deal' (EU action plan) of November 2015. Among others, it turned out that significant veto powers in both countries were not in sight and that a non-agreement would have raised the political costs for the EU side more than for Turkey, thus pointing at an asymmetrical distribution of bargaining power in favour of Turkey.*

**Keywords:** Syrian refugee crisis, EU Action Plan, Turkey, Merkel, two-level analysis, win-set

---

\* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science, Turkish-German University, krumm@tau.edu.tr

## 1. Introduction

With issues involved such as the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), the contested Syrian regime, international military interventions, Russian engagement and several terrorist attacks (Ankara, Egypt, Paris), the Syrian (refugee) crisis and European attempts to cope with it is a multi-dimensional issue par excellence. The Syrian crisis and German Chancellor Merkel’s ad hoc decision of September 4, 2015 for unconditional passage of refugees queuing at the Balkan route, especially in Hungary, has given new momentum to EU-Turkish relations. On September 4, in the face of tens of thousands of stranded refugees at the Hungarian border Chancellor Merkel decided ad hoc<sup>1</sup> to suspend “European asylum rules and allowing thousands of refugees stranded in Europe to enter Germany via Austria. The move was hailed at the time as a bold gesture by a leader who has long been guided by the spirit of compromise and consensus.”<sup>2</sup>

As a consequence, about 200,000 refugees entered Germany in September 2015, a total of 1.1 million until the end of year. Local authorities were overwhelmed by the scope of the refugee influx, which left them struggling with covering basic needs such as food and housing, health and education. After a while, this ad hoc policy change by chancellor Merkel became disputed. While initially praised as an act of humanity and moral leadership, public opinion and her own party became more critical over time, with some even calling it a “national catastrophe”.<sup>3</sup> Such criticism and some more domestic quarrels (analyzed in section 3.2) could weaken her position in the talks at international level, towards EU policy-making as well as towards Turkey. Because of such pressures, the grand coalition (CDU/CSU/SPD) decided in mid-November to partially curb its open doors policy, however, too late to directly affect the negotiations on the EU action plan of mid-October.

In recent years, EU-Turkish relations had become more sober for several reasons, with the European Commission’s annual progress report pointing at both improvements and backlashes in Turkey’s domestic development towards implementing the European ‘acquis’. The opening up of new chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations had been blocked by the Cyprus question and by France. Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy expressed fundamental concern regarding a Turkish EU membership<sup>4</sup>. On the other side, the Turkish government remained committed to full membership; with a strong focus on reforms especially between 2002 and 2006.<sup>5</sup> However, against the ‘gridlock’ in EU-Turkish relations more recently, the Merkel decision of early September created a need for joint action including Turkey to effectively tackle the uncontrolled influx of Near and Middle East originated refugees across EU borders.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the refugee crisis or more specifically, the Merkel decision of early September opened up a ‘window of opportunity’ for creating new dynamics in EU-Turkey relations.

In order to cope with the complexity of the topic, the focus of this paper is on EU-Turkish negotiations and the constellation of interests that led up to the agreement of the EU ‘action plan’ as agreed on the Brussels summits on October 15 and November 29, 2015. At EU side its focus is on Germany, as crucial policies of autumn 2015 seems to be (pre)shaped by German authorities. Methodologically, the paper applies the ‘logic of two-level games’ as outlined by Robert Putman<sup>7</sup> and of veto power and win-sets, as outlined by George Tsebelis<sup>8</sup>. The veto player approach might be useful not only to get a better understanding of each actor’s win-set (size), but also to get an idea of veto power, outlined by Tsebelis as the capacity of an actor to create policy stability by rejecting to consent a change of the status quo. In other words, veto players are those actors whose consent is needed to achieve a change of the current status quo. This article examines bargaining power and the sizes of the win-set of each side. In order to reduce complexity, the focus will be on the constellation and strategy of Germany and Turkey as in a bilateral negotiation. Turkish-EU relations have been revived as the course of the Syrian refugee crisis impacted German domestic policy more and more. Thus, Turkey has been named a crucial actor as regards coping with the refugee crisis and its impact on Germany’s ‘open doors’ policy since early September 2015.

This article analyses the bargaining powers of the two sides against their specific domestic pressures and limitations. Focusing only at domestic developments would be too narrow. Given the still worsening regional political context, the article also asks for possible

implications of these level II (domestic) developments for level I (international) negotiations and outcomes. As the above terms already suggest, the methodology will be provided by the concept of a two-level-game as introduced by Robert Putnam. The article then asks for possible implications of the October 2015 EU action plan on Turkey's international relations with regard to EU and Germany. The focus on the latter takes into consideration Germany's role as a key player of European policy-making and its 'special relationship' with Turkey. While analytically there is a clear distinction between EU policy making and German interests, in practice Germany has become an influential actor in shaping EU policies. Thus, the focus of this research is especially on determinants of the German and Turkish 'win-sets' in the talks leading up to the (preliminary) EU action plan of the October 15 Brussels council summit, followed by a visit of chancellor Merkel to Istanbul on October 18, and finally the joint summit of November 29, presenting the now finalised refugee action plan.

## 2. Analytic framework: the logic of two-level games within intergovernmental settings

### 2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The multi-level approach as developed by Putnam as well as the ideas of Moravcsik<sup>9</sup> have a similar context in the field of international relations theories. Both focus on the logic of interest maximization and operate at a medium level of abstraction. With regard to EU-Turkey relations, besides IR theories, European Integration theories<sup>10</sup> are relevant. Besides neo-functional approaches, intergovernmentalism has provided a most influential theoretical context for international collaboration respectively integration research, both in the broader field of IR and the integration literature. Thus, this section reflects upon core assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism<sup>11</sup> as a context of multi-level analysis.

According to liberal intergovernmentalism, the shaping of international policies passes several stages or phases, from the articulation of preferences in domestic politics, over to national governments pursuing these policies in international talks or bargains to the successful imposition of policy preferences at international level, shaping policy outcomes or even international organizations and institutions. Each of these stages has its own selectivity (e.g. in terms of veto players) and factors of influence. With the focus on institutions, the approach goes beyond the focus of Putnam, who was primarily interested in explaining policy outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations. As the approach is labelled 'liberal', a special focus is on institutions that help shape and pursue economic interests as perceived to be in the 'national interest'.

For the level of the international negotiations and their outcomes, Moravcsik's focus is on states and their characteristics as predictors of influence in integration negotiations. In contrast to realist approaches, their focus is on process related topics rather than maximising relative power and the usual 'realist' suspects such as economic performance. Regarding the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations, liberal intergovernmentalists would point at national actors respectively 'principals' and the European Commission as a more or less dependent 'agent' in the EU-Turkish refugee talks of autumn 2015. According to this view, the Commission can be expected to act as a responsive agent "according to the general policies decided by governments and within the boundaries drawn by member states or under their control. Thus, its claim was that governments used these institutions for their aims and they did not have any autonomy."<sup>12</sup>

This view has been criticised from a supranationalist perspective, which at least points at the influential role of large member states with homogenous and strong interests as a shaper of EU policies, despite more or less autonomous supranational institutions such as the European Commission. Although liberal intergovernmentalism is only one commonly used approach towards European Integration, its core assumptions may help to provide in the following sections helpful insights into policy making in the case of the EU-Turkey refugee crisis talks of autumn 2015.

## 2.2 Win sets and veto power

International policy-making (or governance) is often analysed as multi-level process or ‘game’. The metaphor of a game directs attention to the players, the rules, the playing field(s) and the results (outcome). Methodologically, this also stresses the need to consider different levels of political analysis while carrying out a study. Furthermore, in the field of European politics, theories stress different aspects such as the functional ‘pooling’ of resources as a driver of decision making, cooperation and further delegation of tasks to an inter- or even supranational level. With regard to Turkey-EU relations, functional approaches and intergovernmentalism appear to be a most appropriate analytical framework (see above). In this approach, state governments are the most relevant actors at international level.

However, their positions may be determined by dominant domestic preferences, which severely impact upon government’s international bargaining positions and powers. For example, overlapping interests are regarded as facilitating consensual decision-making but also reducing a state’s bargaining power. Inter-governmentalists see the bargaining power of governments diminishing, the more useful a policy agreement and the bigger a win-set for a government is. On the other hand, diverging domestic constellations of interests and a heterogenic, pluralist domestic constellation can contribute to increased bargaining power at international level. In contrast to this dimension of power, neo-functionalism focuses more on the ‘technical’ dimensions of collaboration or integration in order to achieve (maximize) welfare and/or security gains.<sup>13</sup>

Already at first sight, the refugee deal negotiations of autumn 2015 depict much of a multi-level game, where the ‘win-sets’ of international negotiations and outcomes are strongly determined by domestic constellations. Thus, this chapter introduces the basic logic of a two-level game as outlined by Putnam,<sup>14</sup> adding also basic assumptions of the veto player approach as outlined by George Tsebelis. In the words of Putnam, two-level analysis reacts to the need to take into account both comparative politics and international relations in order to methodologically provide appropriate analytic tools.<sup>15</sup>

Overall, the approach of two-level games focuses on the impact of level I constellations on level II and vice versa. For instance, voluntary or involuntary defection from agreements might be induced from one level to the other and homogeneous or heterogeneous domestic issues might impact on the negotiation outcomes. Furthermore, cross-level and cross-side coalitions (“synergistic issue linkage”) and arrangements, which strengthen decision-makers at home and weaken their international bargaining power abroad at the same time are subject to analysis; international threats, offers and side-payments and their domestic impact, uncertainty about domestic politics and its strategic use, as well as principal-agent problems are further topics of interest.<sup>16</sup>

The crucial term derived from game theory is the win-set, the overlapping of curves of indifference that determine which policy position is still covered by the interests of an actor and which are not. Putnam assumes that “larger win-sets make Level I agreement more likely, *ceteris paribus*. By definition, any successful agreement must fall within the Level II winsets of each of the parties to the accord. Thus, agreement is possible only if those win-sets overlap, and the larger each win-set, the more likely they are to overlap. Conversely, the smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk that the negotiations will break down”<sup>17</sup>. Smaller win-sets also produce a bigger risk of involuntary defection of agreed outcomes, which may lead to well-known “dilemmas of collective action”.<sup>18</sup>

The size of an actor’s win-set also may “affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be ‘pushed around’ by the other Level I negotiators. Conversely, a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage: ‘I’d like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at home’”.<sup>19</sup> Thus, domestic constraints of an actor in international negotiations is not only a disadvantage; it can strategically be used to maximise the realisation of own interests. Furthermore, Putnam points at three factors, which influence the size of a win-set, namely

- the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents
- the Level II political institutions, and
- the strategies of the Level I negotiators

These factors will be analysed in more detail in the next section. Before moving on to these, some critical remarks on win-sets and veto players are appropriate. Both concepts are heavily dependent on game-theoretical assumptions with a quantitative operationalisation. However, quite often for 'real life' applications such as in political science and international relations, quantifications of processes are not possible or are only possible to a limited degree, e.g. by using qualitative variables. Especially (influential) rational choice approaches have been criticized for the tautological structure of its argumentation.<sup>20</sup> Tsebelis' veto players approach deviates from some core assumptions of rational choice as for example the office seeking and vote maximizing theorems. For him, it is policy seeking (or 'ideology'), that determines actors' decisions; he also deviates from the 'black box'-model of political parties by valuing party coherence (or heterogeneity) as another crucial factor influencing the win-set of parties respectively actors. However, even in the veto player approach, metaphors of quantification such as win-sets and curves of indifference suggest a preciseness that in practice often is not easy to realize.

## 2.2 What influenced Turkish and German win-set sizes?

According to Putman, the size of a win-set firstly is influenced by "the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents"<sup>21</sup>. This means especially that lower costs of a non agreement 'for constituents will reduce the size of a win-set. If it comes to the phase of ratification at national level, the choice for the principals is a given agreement against non-agreement. "No-agreement often represents the status quo, although in some cases no-agreement may in fact lead to a worsening situation"<sup>22</sup>.

In the case of the EU-Turkish refugee negotiations, the costs of non-agreement would be much higher for the EU respectively Germany than for Turkey. In case of non-agreement, for Turkey, the status quo would hardly change; for the EU the status quo would worsen, as the influx of illegal refugees would continue or even increase. In other words, non-agreement (as well as time) was an argument on the side of Turkey, not of the EU. While for the EU (especially Germany), non-agreement would lead to a de facto worsening of the status quo, for Turkey a non-agreement would hardly change the status quo. However, a non-agreement could have a negative impact on Turkey's international reputation, as well as for the government's domestic 'image'.

As regards the issue of coherency when faced with multiple partisan actors on both sides, according to Putnam, domestic constellations, be they homogeneous or heterogeneous, can have a huge impact on the bargaining powers of the respective actors at international level. In case of homogenous constellations (leading to 'boundary' conflicts), he assumes that the higher the possible gains at Level I for an actor, the better his chances of securing ratification at home. By using the implicit threat of failing ratification at home, he can try to improve his gains or limit losses in the negotiations. "Glancing over his shoulder at Level II, the negotiator's main problem in a homogeneous conflict is to manage the discrepancy between his constituents' expectations and the negotiable outcome. Neither negotiator is likely to find much sympathy for the enemy's demands among his own constituents, nor much support for his constituents' positions in the enemy camp. The effect of domestic division, embodied in hard-line opposition from hawks, is to raise the risk of involuntary defection and thus to impede agreement at Level I."<sup>23</sup>

In the case of factional conflicts (cross national cleavages during international negotiations, which are very common, for instance in Lebanon), the possible impact on ratification at national level is much more intense. However, the refugee crisis in Turkey and Germany can be characterized as a homogeneous (or border) conflict, as there were some factions within Turkey and in Germany, however, without being able to significantly influence the course of events. At the EU-level, factions did appear towards the end of 2015, as the German popular

‘welcome culture’ vanished and governments from Eastern Europe expressed opposition more loudly. Thus, at the EU level a factional dimension can be observed, with the factions running along the lines of the member states. However, the impact of such a ‘factional’ constellation at the level of the EU can be considered as relatively marginal, as the negotiations about the action plan were so far dominated by Turkish and German interests. Thus, it can be assumed that a factional dimension on the EU side has been dominated by the ‘border’ constellation of relatively homogenous interests at each the Turkish and German side.

Furthermore, Putnam assumes that the “composition of the active Level II constituency (and hence the character of the win-set) also varies with the politicization of the issue. Politicization often activates groups who are less worried about the costs of no-agreement, thus reducing the effective win-set”.<sup>24</sup> Regarding the German domestic constellation, significant opposition to the ‘Merkel-line’ at party level could be expected from the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) or the new right-wing ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD). Inversely to the electoral losses of support of the Schröder government following the Agenda 2010 reforms to the left, the risk of the Merkel approach to the refugee crisis is to increase right-wing support. Indeed, approval rates for the AfD scored up to nine percent to the end of 2015. Thus, politicization of the refugee issue could reduce the policy flexibility and thus the size of the win-set for the Merkel government. On the Turkish side, the situation of a caretaker government after the June 2015 elections could have led to a politicization of the issue at top level. However, similar to Germany, politicization did in practice take place only to a moderate degree.

‘Issue-linkage’ was also practiced in the talks. In theory, this means a situation where a majority in one domestic context opposes a certain policy (as for example a further move towards Turkish EU membership), but parts of that majority are willing to consider switching their position on that issue in return for a quid pro quo on another policy issue. This could be for example a significant Turkish contribution to tackle the influx of illegal migrants into the EU. In the refugee action plan, issue-linkage is given in connecting the refugee issue with the visa free travel for Turkish citizens to the EU, which will be a major achievement of the Turkish government in terms of popularity. The opening up of another negotiation chapter in the accession talks is another example.

Furthermore, the win-set size is influenced by the Level II political institutions according to Putman, who points e.g. at the ratification procedures such as required majorities. The higher the required majority, the smaller the win-set, he assumes.<sup>25</sup> This is somewhat problematic, because decision making at European level requires qualified majorities, sometimes as in the case of the opening of new accession negotiation chapters, even unanimity.<sup>26</sup> This constellation strongly reduces the size of the win-set for the EU as a bargaining power. The action plan of October tackled this problem by not guaranteeing the opening of new chapters, but expressing support for respective ambitions.

Besides the coherency of conflict parties (heterogeneity or homogeneity), the strength of party discipline inside the governing party impacts on the size of a win-set. Strong party discipline in a ruling party (or coalition) is likely to increase the win-set “by widening the range of agreements for which the Level I negotiator can expect to receive backing”<sup>27</sup> However, this is only one side of the medal as strong (party or coalition) discipline also implies more autonomy from domestic pressures and thus weakens the bargaining power of a government at an international level. Putnam argues that “diplomats representing an entrenched dictatorship are less able than representatives of a democracy to claim credibly that domestic pressures preclude some disadvantageous deal.”<sup>28</sup>

Under this aspect of ‘strong’ government, Turkey has definitely had a ‘stronger’ position than the democratic model pupils have in the EU. Strong parties respectively governments are more likely to win easy ratification for the outcomes within their own cabinet or wider domestic policy arena. In case of the German government, even the two ‘grand’ parties CDU/CSU and SPD are represented in cabinet and at least theoretically could obstruct against the proposed results of the negotiations. In terms of party strength, compared to Germany Turkey had a better chances of

getting the proposed deal accepted in cabinet; even under the caretaker government (see section 3.1).

Thirdly, win-set size is influenced by the strategies of the Level I negotiators according to Putman. “Each Level I negotiator has an unequivocal interest in maximizing the other side's win-set, but with respect to his own win-set, his motives are mixed. The larger his win-set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position vis-a-vis the other negotiator. This fact often poses a tactical dilemma”.<sup>29</sup> In this context, side-payments can be used to attract marginal supporters who are at the brink of rejecting the whole deal. “In addition to the use of specific side-payments, a chief negotiator whose political standing at home is high can more easily win ratification of his foreign initiatives”.<sup>30</sup> Uncertainty about the size of a win-set, which is mentioned as another factor of influence, is in the case of EU-Turkey relations rather small, as the flow of information and the perceptions of each other's policy positions and interests are rather transparent.

Another factor is the expectation of voluntary or involuntary defection, also characterized as “deliver-ability” or credibility. This characteristic is supported at international level by the demonstrable ability to “deliver” at the domestic level.<sup>31</sup> This feature is again asymmetrically allocated. It works better for Turkey than for the EU, as in the latter the number of veto players is much higher. Incentives to cheat or defect are low, as the partners can expect to meet again, which usually reduces respective incentives.

Furthermore, the domestic democratic process can impact on international negotiations. The surprising result of the June 7 election could have weakened the Turkish side, as the preliminary deal was struck two weeks before the November 1 elections, which again showed some surprising results. The November results can, however, despite a severe intimidation of the media, be interpreted as a support of a more centralized and presidential style of democracy (some even say authoritarian style), “where the system of checks and balances, already weakened, can be annihilated. This transformation can constitute a dictatorship, i.e., a dictatorship regime functioning under the guise of democracy.”<sup>32</sup>

Regarding the Turkish party system, its format can be described as a dominant party system, albeit with its strong party less dominant than in other cases such as the Fianna Fail in Ireland during long periods after World War II or the United Russia party commencing in 2001. In such cases, accepting domestic power sharing might be an important issue from an international perspective. However, it is up to the international negotiation partners to balance the arguments and decide whether to consider such points for the negotiations.

### 2.3 Hypotheses

As indicated above, the refugee crisis and the EU action plan of autumn 2015 appear to be a ‘game within a game’. The general context is the EU-Turkish relations as mirrored in the standstill or progress of the accession negotiations. These policies are also influenced by the special topic of Turkish-Cyprus relations and Cypriot veto power within the EU. However, in the refugee crisis talks of autumn 2015 bargaining powers seemed to have changed in favour of Turkey. Whereas in the accession talks, time for instance is on the side of the sceptical member states such as France or even active veto players such as Cyprus, in the subset of the refugee crisis time works in favour of Turkey, respectively against Germany. In the accession talks, the EU (and member states with special interests such as Cyprus) are obviously in a ‘stronger’ position, in the refugee crisis talks delays would come at a much higher price for the EU respectively Germany.

In the refugee crisis, the EU was obviously much more in an agenda setting role, while Turkey was in a role of a veto player regarding EU suggestions. For instance, in a first step EU diplomats and member states such as Germany were in direct contact with Turkish diplomats and officials to set up the preliminary refugee action plan as agreed in mid-October. In this process, the Turkish veto power could raise its outcome by taking advantage of the large-scale EU win-set especially produced by the German open door policy.

In other words, the EU's bargaining power was weakened by Germany's large scale win-set in combination with its most influential position for EU policy making. Opposition to Germany's policy in Western Europe was weak, in contrast to the states of Eastern Europe, such as Hungary or the newly elected conservative government and president in Poland. However, at least in autumn 2015, their positions appeared to be marginalized in the EU-Turkey refugee talks; consequently, a mode of distributing the payments of 3 billion Euros across the member states was not mentioned in the action plan. Given the German dominance in EU policy making, opposition from these states did not find its way into the action plan.

On the other side, Turkey's bargaining power might have been affected by the results of the June 2015 general election and the commencing situation (section 3.1). Turkey itself is affected by this crisis not only by the inflow of 2.07 mill. registered Syrian refugees until October 2015 according to UNHCR<sup>33</sup> but also by three major bomb attacks in 2015, with the double blast at a peace demonstration in Ankara on October 10 by Turkish Islamic State (IS) supporters already claiming the lives of 102 and contributing to a further polarization of the domestic political climate. The negotiations of autumn 2015 also took place while Turkey was heading towards its second general election in 2015, to be held on November 1, as the AK Party for the first time failed to win an absolute majority of seats. In other words, both sides at the international bargaining table in autumn 2015 did have some domestic pressures.

### **3. Comparative analysis**

This chapter aims to figure out how the domestic constellation in Turkey and Germany in autumn 2015 has influenced the negotiations and outcomes of the refugee crisis talks and the setup of the EU action plan. The focus of interest is on factors influencing the win-set size and veto powers of each side.

#### **3.1 Impact of the domestic situation in Turkey on its win-set**

As already theoretically introduced above, the setback for the AKP in June, the finally not successful coalition talks, the presidential decision to call for snap election, the need for an instalment of a (theoretically all party) caretaker government, the new electoral campaign as well as the Ankara attacks of October 10 could have negatively impacted on Turkey's negotiation power in advance of the EU action plan talks. However, these theoretically obstructive factors might have been balanced by the power of a only recently (2014) directly elected president with a strong majority of 51.9 percent in the first round. In the remainder of this section, we aim to access the impact of the above-mentioned conditions on the Turkish bargaining power in the autumn 2015 refugee talks.

- The setback for AKP in the June 2015 elections could have impacted Turkey's negotiating power if it would have led over to either a longer period of instability or to a coalition government with an additional 'veto player' at government level. An additional strong veto player at cabinet level with responsibility for the foreign affairs department could have significantly affected the size of the win-set, as homogeneity of policy-making could suffer and for example lead to less policy coherence at government level. However, in late summer 2015 it soon became clear that the leading party was heading towards snap elections and hoping for a better mandate.

- The unsuccessful coalition talks were less surprising, as it was expected that the AKP did not feel content with the idea of entering into a coalition. Thus, it was widely believed that the lack of success in the talks was not unwelcomed by the erstwhile ruling party, as it would open up the opportunity of new elections later in autumn. Thus, it can be assumed that the lack of success was also instrumental for paving the way for snap elections later on. With regard to the international level, this means that the unsuccessful coalition talks did not have a significant impact on the Turkish negotiating power. However, the situation would have been completely different if the November election had produced a similar result as the June election. In this case,

coalition talks would have become much more important as the option of different results as a result of snap elections would have diminished.

- The decision of the president to call for snap elections was at that time from opposition perspective also seen as creating additional uncertainty or as a waste of time, while from AKP's perspective it was an expression of confidence that a snap election will improve its result and lead to a single party cabinet. In fact, it did work as a game changer and entrusted the AKP with a new and strong mandate on November 1th. Despite at the time of the joint action plan draft of mid-October this result was not foreseeable, it was unlikely that the next prime minister would have been different from the acting one. Thus, the situation of pending elections might have impacted on the bargaining power of the PM Davutoğlu cabinet. The directly elected strong president however also compensated for this.

- The setting-up of a caretaker government in September 2015 was a consequence of the above decision. According to the Turkish constitution, a caretaker government has to be formed comprising all parliamentary parties according to their strength in parliament. Thus, the share of seats in parliament of a given party determines its share of cabinet posts a party has a right to fill in. Thus, the share of cabinet sets was determined in August 2015 by the Speaker of the GNA as 11 for the AKP, 5 for the CHP, and each 3 for the MHP and HDP. Three cabinet posts (Communication, Justice, Home affairs) were granted to independents. If a party does not take up the cabinet posts, as did CHP and MHP, their seats were given to independents. Although the MHP decided not to take part in the caretaker government, one of its members did join the government (and was expelled from the party before the November election, but returned to parliament on the AKP list). In the case of the HDP deputy L. Tüzel it was the other way around. He refused to take part in the caretaker government despite the HDPs willingness to do so. Consequently, he was not re-nominated for the November election.<sup>34</sup>

A MHP member (Tuğrul Türkeş) who initially took part in the cabinet on the MHP ticket and subsequently switched party affiliation further increased the AKP share of seats. In addition, four of the independents were regarded as being close to AKP, with some of them leaving the party briefly before the cabinet was set up. AKP cabinet posts included the office of Prime Minister (Davutoğlu) and three Deputy Prime Ministers. The two HDP members in government took up the posts for EU affairs and Development until they stepped back on 22. September. The MHP dissident took up the Office of Deputy Prime Minister with focus on Council of State, Cyprus and National Security Council. Independents took up the post for Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Energy and Natural Resources, Food/Agriculture/Livestock, Culture and Tourism, Defence, Labour and Social Security, Transport/Maritime and Communication, Family and Social Policy, EU Affairs, Development, Customs and Trade (with four of them being former AKP members). As of October 1, exactly 50 per cent of cabinet posts were held by AKP members and 50 per cent by independents. In addition, the portfolio of EU Affairs as well as Foreign Affairs were given to an independent (Feridun Sinirlioğlu), who prior to his appointment (and thereafter) already acted as undersecretary of foreign affairs (the highest ranking non-political ministerial position).

- Upcoming elections may weaken a government's international bargaining power, as they create some uncertainty of results. Thus, international bargaining partners are not sure if they will sit at the table with the same people after the election as before the elections. Even at the level of diplomatic negotiation, this might not necessarily mean a replacement of negotiators but a setup of new directives. However, in the case of Turkey, a replacement of the prime minister was out of question. The question was only if a minor coalition partner was needed or not. Even in the case of a 'small coalition', the AKP and its chair Davutoğlu would have remained in power. In addition, there are ways to diminish a junior partner's influence on foreign policy making by 'coalition governance'.<sup>35</sup>

If the coalition partner does not take over a foreign policy related department, his ability to shape policies can be further diminished to veto options at the cabinet table.<sup>36</sup> Beside the uncertainty of a need for a coalition, the question of the HDP crossing the threshold draw some

attention again. Furthermore, the campaigning has been described by independent media as unfair and intimidating,

- Also, the IS bombings in Suruç (July 20) and Ankara (Oct. 10) as well as several PKK attacks contributed to a polarizing campaign atmosphere in the time between the elections. However, the possible impact of these conditions at an international level can be assessed as rather low. For the talks at international level, this is more ‘noise’ than ‘voice’. The October 10, 2015 (10/10/15) attacks in Ankara were probably meant to be a ‘game changer’ (similar to the 7/7/2005 attacks in London and the 11/03/2004 attacks in Madrid), to destabilize Turkey by inciting the different ends of the political spectrum against each other. Thus, they were not directed against the government (party) but a HDP dominated peace demonstration, thus targeting pro-Kurdish ‘enemies’ of IS and contributing to polarization and destabilization in domestic affairs.

- The directly elected strong president may compensate for the above-mentioned disadvantages. However, the Turkish constitution limits the powers of the president to primarily representative functions respectively obliges him to impartiality (article 101). On the other hand, the results of the 2014 direct presidential elections with 51.9 per cent of votes in favour of later incumbent was interpreted as a strong legitimation for a more active role of the new president.

- Alternative options for the EU to tackle the crisis are less promising or even not existing, as Turkey is on the main transit route not only for Syrian and Iraqi but also for central Asian refugees such as from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, some form of agreement or EU collaboration with Turkey is indispensable for tackling the crisis. On the other side, public opinion in Turkey is less pressured by the refugee topic than in some of the EU countries, especially in the southeast of the bloc and the wealthier Western European countries that were the desired final destinations of the migrants.

This puts Turkey in a very strong bargaining position. Via issue linking the refugee crisis opens up chances for Turkey to set impulses or create ‘movement’ in other fields of policy regarding EU-Turkish relations, where progress has been stalled in recent years. Strategically using the lack of alternatives for EU policy makers and the (not only geographically) key Turkish position as a indispensable actor to tackle the refugee crisis came also clear in a twitter statement of a top Turkish policy advisor in this matter. According to a newspaper, an advisor of president Erdoğan (Burhan Kuzu) characterized the refugee deal on his twitter account in early December as a clear win for Turkey, because “the EU finally bowed to Turkey's threat to open its borders to refugees by deciding to provide Turkey with financial support for the migrant crisis.”<sup>37</sup>

The provisional results of mid-October's EU action plan was confirmed later on and further substantiated. By late November the EU Commission confirmed the set-up of a € 3 billion fund “to help improve the living conditions of migrants in Turkey and prevent further influxes into Europe. The agreement was finalized on Nov. 29 at the EU-Turkey summit held in Brussels, where Turkey promised to help stem the flow of migrants to Europe in return for financial support, visa-free travel to Europe's Schengen zone and renewed EU accession talks.”<sup>38</sup> The November 29 EU-Turkey summit was the first since 2004, when Turkey became official candidate and the first negotiation chapters were opened.

### **3.2 Impact of the domestic situation in Germany on its win-set**

Among the main drivers for a compromise with Turkey regarding the refugee influx to the EU was German chancellor Angela Merkel. As the main driver for refugee cooperation with Turkey on the German side, some factors might have impacted negatively in autumn 2015 on the size of its win-set. As a supranational institution with a focus less on input- than on output legitimization,<sup>39</sup> the EU itself seems less directly ‘affectable’ by a changing will of the people. Whereas responsiveness towards input-legitimation is reduced, powerful nation states such as France and Germany can still severely affect EU decision making via the European Council. Decision making on the refugee issue and the agreement of the EU action plan also took place on a Council

meeting, namely on October 15 and November 29 in Brussels. Certainly, Council meetings have their own dynamics, producing their own outcomes in a process which provides several options for shaping or ‘uploading’ national policy preferences to the European level.<sup>40</sup> In Germany in autumn 2015, the following factors could have influenced the government’s bargaining power.

• Media pressure by news of thousands of illegal entries per day might pile up a pressure for fast action on the government. Furthermore, it has influenced chancellor Merkel’s popularity. Her shrinking popularity was especially recognisable during October and November and began to change in December. In a survey published late September by a news magazine (*Der Spiegel*), she lost for the first time in this legislative period her position as most popular politician, ranking only at fourth place. In addition, in a survey of the TV magazine (*ZDF Politbarometer*), she was ranked only as the fourth most important German politician.<sup>41</sup> However, ups and downs in a chancellor’s popularity are not uncommon and still relatively moderate compared to those of French presidents during their course in office. With regard to Merkel’s term, the time of autumn 2015 was just in the mid of the legislative period, that will end in autumn 2017. Thus, it can be concluded that issues of popularity are not at the forefront of her concerns.<sup>42</sup>

• Increasing support for right wing and populist parties and movements such as the ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) and the Pegida movement. In this context, on October 17, the future mayor of Cologne was heavily injured by a knife attack by a xenophobe right-winger for her support of the government’s open door policy. Between July and October 2015, the AfD was estimated between 3 and 4 percent of votes, while in November in the polls they virtually crossed the five percent level, with some surveys even estimating up to nine percent of total votes.<sup>43</sup> However, from a perspective of ‘Realpolitik’, the aim of a given cabinet’s policy is usually not to keep certain opposition parties down and out. A similar contested case has been the ‘Agenda 2010’ reforms of chancellor Schröder in 2003, which have contributed to the split of the left-wingers from the governing social democrats and their formation as WASG, which was in 2007 merged with the PDS to form the Left and contributed to the ‘Western expansion’ of the former PDS. In both cases, policy choices were not dominated by short-term vote seeking or strategic considerations, but by policy seeking respectively realising policy reforms that were recognised as necessary or indispensable.

• Intra government opposition from the CSU became especially visible at the CSU party conference on November 20, when CSU chair and Bavarian Prime Minister Seehofer publicly asked for a “course correction” of Merkel’s open doors refugee policy. While the CSU party convention adopted a request for a ceiling of refugee numbers, Merkel rejected such a stance of unilaterally adopted ceilings.<sup>44</sup> Instead, she supports the introduction of national quotas for each EU member state and the distribution of refugees across Europe according to these quotas, as proposed by the European Commission. However, this proposal is severely contested, especially by Eastern European member states (see next point). Regarding the CSU opposition to Merkel’s policy, it may contribute to the (temporarily) decrease of Merkel’s popularity, but is less likely to endanger the governing Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD in total.

• Opposition especially from Eastern European members towards the international distribution of refugees according to quotas is strong. The commission’s proposal to distribute 160.000 refugees faced strong opposition from Poland’s new PM Beata Szydło and Hungary’s Victor Orban. A EU-wide distribution of refugees as initially proposed by the Commission and supported by Merkel found only moderate support by some Western European states. Instead, selective ‘coalitions of the willing’ or issue focused collaboration arose, for instance with the Balkan summit of 13 heads of state (including non-members Macedonia, Serbia and Albania) on October 25 in Brussels to address humanitarian matters of the refugees on the so called Western Balkan route. Despite low expectations at the beginning, this Balkan summit led to an agreement to better information exchange and border control as well as the setup of 100,000 refugee host places.<sup>45</sup> Another example for such a selective coalition is Brussels meeting of eight “like-minded” (Western) EU members plus Turkey to discuss visa and immigration issues.<sup>46</sup>

To sum up, in a similar vein to opposition from the CSU at domestic level as examined above, the opposition faced at European level is less likely to directly affect the bargaining power in the talks with Turkey. With regard to level I and level II entanglements, showing that the Merkel cabinet does not bow to pressure from public opinion, decreasing popularity as well as from the Bavarian coalition partner, indicates a large size of the win-set at level I. Argue that the Merkel government is limited in their options due to domestic constraints regarding the ratification process is less convincing. Contrarily, being able to ‘sell’ nearly everything at home opens up a huge win-set at level I. However, this criterion is also given in Turkey after the November 1 elections. During the October talks and the Merkel visit to Istanbul on October 18, this was less clear.

#### **4. Results: the logic of two-level games in the October 2015 negotiations**

In the above chapter, the focus was on the domestic level and the impact of constellation in both Turkey and Germany for the win-set size from each others’ perspective. In this section, the focus is on the international level and the specific conditions that are linked to his level. According to the above analysis, there was no substantial limitation for the size of the win-set from the German perspective. No strong opposition inside government or parliament was expressing realistic pressures of sanctioning the open doors policy or the subsequent negotiations with Ankara. However, only at EU level there is the need for unanimity, which at least theoretically poses a huge limitation to the win-set size.

Directly addressing the issue of EU-German differences, it seems that for the negotiation of the EU action plan, Germany has had a huge influence not only in terms of content but also in negotiation power. About one month after Merkel’s decision to suspend the respective Schengen rules in the night from fourth to fifth September, the European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker outlined an EU refugee action plan and discussed it with Turkish president Erdoğan “during his visit to Brussels on October 5.”<sup>47</sup> At this stage of talks, the EU plan offered one billion Euros of compensation for setting up “new refugee camps and boosting its Coast Guard to slow the flow of people to Europe”<sup>48</sup> Shortly thereafter, the sum was raised to three billion Euros in the context of the October 15 summit in Brussels, which outlined a draft migration action plan.

The German interest in a ‘sustainable solution’ became obvious during Merkel’s visit to Istanbul only three days later, on October 18, at the heights of the electoral campaign in Turkey, to hold talks with PM Davutoğlu and President Erdoğan. As this visit took place shortly before the November 1 general election, Merkel attracted a lot of criticism from Turkish opposition parties, arguing she would sacrifice human rights and press freedom issues for the sake of a refugee deal with Turkey. It is also reported that in these talks the fundamentals of the EU action plan as already outlined a few days before in Brussels were reiterated and that the timing of the visits illustrated the urgency of the matter on the German side.

During her visit on October 18, Merkel pledged “to give support to four Turkish demands on which Ankara has insisted in return for agreeing to a migrant action plan” with the EU.<sup>49</sup> Financial support, the readmission agreement, visa requirements and accelerating the opening of chapters 17, 23 and 24 were main concessions she made on her visit. Although it was not clear if these offers were made on behalf of the EU or not, she offered the 3 billion euros to improve Syrian refugee’s living conditions, as well as lifting “the visa requirement for Turkish citizens traveling to Europe in return for Turkey pledging to take in immigrants sent back by the EU, and the opening of Chapters 23 and 24 of the *acquis* that deals with the judiciary and fundamental rights with a view to activate accession talks that have long been halted.”<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, including Turkey in the list of ‘safe states’ regarding asylum applications by Turkish citizens was another point reportedly agreed on in this meeting. The deal was finalized in a further EU summit on November 29, with the Turkish prime minister attending.

In the remainder of this section, we ask how to access the EU refugee action plan of autumn 2015 in terms of gains and losses, of win-sets and bargaining power. From the side of the

Turkish government, the package deal including the action plan was described as the opening of a new chapter in EU-Turkish relations. According to EU minister Bozkır,

*“this new era is going to provide us with a better understanding and more solidarity. [...] We are very happy that after so many months Europe has understood that this issue cannot be only left on Turkey's shoulders but we have to work together, we have to think together in order to find solutions for today's important problem. This is taken in the summit and the working plan for migration flows will be implemented.”<sup>51</sup>*

| 32

Turkey was potentially weakened first by the stalemate of the political process after the June 2015 election and later by the ‘hung parliament’ and the difficulties of forming a coalition government.

Was the caretaker cabinet of autumn 2015 weakening the Turkish bargaining position in international politics? To answer this it might be helpful to have a look at the exceptional situation of a coalition government in the United Kingdom. In the Conservatives-Liberal Democrats coalition following the British elections of May 2010, the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs went to the Conservatives (William Hague). A separate ministry for EU affairs as in Turkey does not exist in the UK. Important decisions in international politics are the domain of the British Prime Minister. A similar constellation can be assumed for the Turkish caretaker cabinet. Here, a directly elected president with executive ambitions, encompassing also the field of international politics, further complicates the constellation.

In practice, it is difficult to access the outcome of the refugee talks (EU action plan) in terms of bargaining power or ‘winners and losers’. However, independent international commentators mainly agreed that Turkey did a good job in the negotiations and that the outcome can be read as a success from the side of Turkish interests. The action plan preliminarily agreed in mid-October “between the European Commission and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s president, is highly ambitious and includes a host of sweeteners that Ankara has sought in vain for many years, according to officials familiar with the terms”.<sup>52</sup>

As the action plan has to be financed by the EU member states, there is some uncertainty left, e.g. on the allocation of financial contributions to the €3bn costs between the members, “many of whom are wary of the high political and financial price Mr Erdogan is demanding. As part of the deal, a summit of EU leaders is expected to offer a clear political signal that it supports the co-operation, while stopping short of endorsing individual terms.” The sum of three billion Euro “in fresh funds” is “more than six-times the amount first proposed by the commission; a process to open around five chapters in Turkey’s EU membership negotiations; and visa liberalisation giving 75m Turks immediate access to the Schengen border-free area as soon as 2016.”<sup>53</sup>

Furthermore, the Turkish President made clear that he expects Turkey to be included in the EU’s ‘safe list’, “which would make it easier to reject Turkish asylum seekers. He also expects the EU to hold a joint summit with Turkey, or issue an invite for him to speak to a summit of EU leaders” in return for strengthening Turkish border controls and foster co-operation with Greece on the subject. “In exchange for visa privileges, in particular, it would enact a ‘readmission’ deal to receive asylum seekers deported from the EU after entering from Turkish territory. Turkey would eventually also give the 2m Syrian refugees a legal route to make a living in Turkey, reducing the incentives to attempt to enter Europe.”<sup>54</sup> In the Turkish media, the deal was criticized at least from two sides. It was labeled as a ‘dirty deal’ by the oppositions and critical media, as it implicitly would include turning a blind eye to problematic domestic developments, from a nationalist point of view it was also labeled as buying silence for a problematic EU refugee policy. However, similar to critical voices in Germany, they were not able to change any detail of the refugee action plan deal.

## 5. Conclusion

This section aims to summarize the main findings from above and – as an outlook – points to the fact that games played in (or with) the EU are usually multi round games. The ‘players’ of such games will most likely meet again in different games on different policies. Then, the losers from previous games can be winners and current winners might be losers. However, not each game is played in terms of winners and losers, as Fritz W. Scharpf has illustrated.<sup>55</sup> In repeated games for example ‘reputation’ becomes more important, as it is a helpful strategy of ‘self-binding’, it can increase (or decrease) the credibility of a negating actor.<sup>56</sup> Credible self-binding limits the options and thus can contribute to a faster decision making by eliminating certain options. It makes it easier not only to announce certain goals but also to realize them. Dixit/Nalebuff illustrate this correlation between self-binding and bargaining power with the case of the Berlin crisis 1961, in which John F. Kennedy emphasized the role of reputation for the strategic position of the USA.<sup>57</sup>

Self-binding can also be used to reject negotiations completely, as in the case of negotiations with terrorists or with dictators. Not to (directly) negotiate with hostage-takers for instance is a standard measure in dealing with crisis by most politicians; however, it takes much determination. In other words, self-binding increases the bargaining power by making certain own actions more credible or expectable. Certain actions which might be regarded as unlikely (because of high short-term transaction costs) can be made more likely by a credible self-binding (see e.g. president Kennedy’s famous self-binding 1963 by announcing “Ich bin ein Berliner”). However, in the case of the commitment to the open door policy, this self-binding may have strengthened humanitarian values, but not the bargaining power in the refugee talks with Turkey, as the (domestic) price of a non-agreement especially in Germany in the mid- and long-term would have been much higher. In the case of the refugee action plan, the credible commitment to certain values and policies could not be used to set up ‘red lines’ not to be crossed during the negotiation.

Consequently, old ‘red lines’ set out by the European Commission and single member states (such as the blocking or opening of new negotiation chapters) were now ready to be tested. Giving in then means more than just to giving in to the current demands of others, it also makes future actions of the other side more likely.<sup>58</sup> Against this background it can be rational to prioritize non-agreement over a compromise which only pushes further tests of their own determination. As far as we have seen in chapter three, commitments to ‘red lines’ or certain policies were not visibly communicated in the German as well as in the Turkish discourse.

According to the above analysis inspired by the two-level game approach the size of the national government’s (actor’s) win-sets are less affected by domestic constellations. In the cases of the refugee crisis international factors determined the negotiation process, not national factors such as the caretaker government in Turkey or some media pressure on Merkel. This means there is considerable selectivity among the domestic factors that can impact at the international level and those factors that do not. Besides the selectivity of factors that appear to be ‘noise’ or ‘voice’ for a national government’s position at international level, the above analysis has also asked for factors influencing symmetry or asymmetry of bargaining power between the two sides. The above analysis tried to provide evidence that in the case of the autumn 2015 EU-Turkey refugee crisis negotiations bargaining power was distributed asymmetrically in favor of Turkey, despite the situation of a caretaker government.

According to ‘realistic’ presumptions of international politics, it is strategy and interest which determine the outcome of bargaining sessions. Regarding foreign policy-making, the elections may influence the power sharing between the prime minister and the president. With the move of former premier Erdoğan to the office of president, a new ‘player’ emerged in the field in form of his successor, PM and AKP chair Ahmet Davutoğlu. The June election was the first defeat for Davutoğlu, the November election the first grand victory for him as new PM. For future, much will depend on the ‘role-taking’ and ‘role-shaping’ of their respective offices.

If the saying is true that every crisis also bears its chances, then Turkey has grasped the chances of the refugee crisis to successfully revive some policy processes stagnating in recent years. Given the larger size of Germany's (respectively EU's) win-set compared to Turkey's, it is less surprising that Turkey used its strong negotiations skills to leverage the outcome in several dimensions: financial aspect, visa liberalization, EU accession negotiations and last but not least for symbolic politics with the EU-Turkey summit of November 29, 2015. Elements such as the visa liberalization also contribute to popular support of the respective deal.

Turning back to game theory, the autumn 2015 refugee talks have not been a single, isolated game. Further games will follow, e.g. on visa liberalization or the opening of new accession negotiation chapters. In these cases, each single EU member state has a much bigger veto power as in the so far relatively 'mild weather' talks of autumn 2015. From a game theoretical approach there are similarities between football and politics, at least in the saying "The next match is always the hardest"

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The decision was coordinated via telephone with Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann.
- <sup>2</sup> "Merkel's growing agony over refugee crisis", *Financial Times*, October 16, 2015, 8.
- <sup>3</sup> "Merkel's growing agony", *Financial Times*, 8.
- <sup>4</sup> Eight chapters were blocked from further negotiation following a recommendation of the European Commission in autumn 2006 due to a lack of implementation of the extension of the customs union to the 10 new member states from 2004, especially Cyprus. Other chapters were blocked from opening by France and Cyprus, see Horst Bacia, „Ausgang ungewiss – die Verhandlungen über einen Beitritt zur EU“, in *Länderbericht Türkei*, ed. Udo Steinbach (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012), 431-463, 455.
- <sup>5</sup> Bacia, „Ausgang ungewiss“.
- <sup>6</sup> See e.g. "EU cannot solve migrant influx without Turkey, German Chancellor Merkel says", *Daily Sabah*, October 16, 2015, 8. "German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Turkey plays a key role in solving the 'historic task' of dealing with Europe's migrant crisis and that the European Union should do more to help Ankara deal with the influx of refugees." The article also points at "a bitterly divided EU" in its struggle to cope with the refugee crisis (8).
- <sup>7</sup> Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization* 42:3 (1988): 427-460.
- <sup>8</sup> George Tsebelis, *Veto Players. How political institutions work*. (Princeton: PUP, 2012).
- <sup>9</sup> See Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", in *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31: 4 (1993): 473-523. Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder", in *Journal of Common Market Studies* 33: 4 (1995), 611-628. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (London: UCL Press, 1998). Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Current Commentary and Future Research: a Response to James Caporaso, Fritz Scharpf, and Helen Wallace*, in *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:1 (1999), 168-179.
- <sup>10</sup> Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Marika Lerch (eds.): *Theorien der europäischen Integration*. (Wiesbaden: VS 2006); Antje Wiener and Thomas Dietz, *European Integration Theory*. (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
- <sup>11</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelpfennig, „Liberal Intergovernmentalism“, in *European Integration Theory*, (eds.) Antje Wiener and Thomas Dietz, (Oxford: OUP 2009), 67-87.
- <sup>12</sup> Murat Coşkun, "A discussion on the theories of European Integration: Does Liberal Intergovernmentalism offer a satisfactory answer?" in *Suleyman Demirel University: The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences* 20: 2 (2015), 387-395, 393.
- <sup>13</sup> Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three neo-functional hypotheses about international integration", in *International Organization*. 23:1 (1969), 161-166. Cinar Özen, "Neo-functionalism and the Change in the Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations", in *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 3: 3 (1998), 34-57.

Catherine Macmillan, "The Application of Neofunctionalism to the Enlargement Process: The Case of Turkey", in *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47:4 (2009), 789–809.

<sup>14</sup> Putnam, „Diplomacy and Domestic Politics“; see also Klaus Brummer and Kai Oppermann, *Außenpolitikanalyse*, (München: Oldenbourg, 2014).

Kai Oppermann, *Prinzipale und Agenten in Zwei-Ebenen-Spielen die innerstaatlichen Restriktionen der Europapolitik Grossbritanniens unter Tony Blair*, (Wiesbaden: VS, 2007).

<sup>15</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 459.

<sup>16</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 460.

<sup>17</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 437f.

<sup>18</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 439.

<sup>19</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 440.

<sup>20</sup> Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. A Critique of Applications in Political Science*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

<sup>21</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 442.

<sup>22</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 442.

<sup>23</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 444.

<sup>24</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 445.

<sup>25</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 448.

<sup>26</sup> This gives single member states a strong veto position in ongoing accession negotiations. See e.g. "Turkey, EU meet in Brussels to further negotiate deal on refugees", in *Daily Sabah*, November 30, 2015, 1: "In addition to the financial aid, Turkey wants to see several chapters opened. Chapter 15, 17, 23, 24, 26 and 31 are expected to be opened by the EU. On the issue, the Greek-Cypriot side seems to be the only obstacle, which should be dealt with in order to make progress."

<sup>27</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 449.

<sup>28</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 449.

<sup>29</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 450.

<sup>30</sup> "Note that each Level I negotiator has a strong interest in the popularity of his opposite number, since Party A's popularity increases the size of his win-set, and thus increases both the odds of success and the relative bargaining leverage of Party B. Thus, negotiators should normally be expected to try to reinforce one another's standing with their respective constituents. Partly for this reason and partly because of media attention, participation on the world stage normally gives a head of government a special advantage vis-a-vis his or her domestic opposition." Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 451-52.

<sup>31</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics", 439.

<sup>32</sup> *Today's Zaman*, November 07, A 5.

<sup>33</sup> <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>, accessed October 28, 2015.

<sup>34</sup> MHP did re-nominate 72 of its 80 MPs from the June election and CHP 128 from its 131 candidates from the June election.

<sup>35</sup> Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strom, "Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance", in *Cabinets and Coalition bargaining*, (eds): Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 51-84.

<sup>36</sup> Kai Oppermann and Klaus Brummer, "Patterns of Junior Partner Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments", in *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16:4, 555–571, accessed November 28, 2015, doi 10.1111/1467-856X.12025

<sup>37</sup> According to *Today's Zaman*, December 3, 2015, A2, Kuzu said in his tweet: "The EU finally got Turkey's message and opened its purse strings. What did we say? 'We'll open our borders and unleash all the Syrian refugees on you'"

<sup>38</sup> *Today's Zaman*, December 3, 2015, A 2.

<sup>39</sup> Fritz W. Scharpf, "Problem-solving effectiveness and democratic accountability in the EU", in MPIfG working paper, No. 03/1: 2003, <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41664>

<sup>40</sup> Tanja Börzel, "Member State Responses to Europeanization", in *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:2 (2002), 193-214.

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-09/angela-merkel-cdu-beliebtheit-politik-gefluechtete-afd>, accessed November 29, 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, as there are rumours of her not striving for a fourth term in office, her contested open doors policy might also be interpreted in the light of political legacy.

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/sonntagsfrage-umfragen-zu-bundestagswahl-landtagswahl-europawahl-a-944816.html>, accessed November 29, 2015.

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/csu-parteitag-seehofer-fordert-kurskorrektur-der-kanzlerin-13922992.html>, accessed November 29, 2015.

<sup>45</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlinge-westbalkan-konferenz-der-eu-wird-erfolg-a-1059533.html>, accessed November 29, 2015.

<sup>46</sup> See Turkish EU minister Bozkır in an interview with *Daily Sabah* on 7 December 2015, p.8: “Moreover, regarding the issue of immigration and refugees, eight countries with similar views established a group within the EU. Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Holland, Germany and the Scandinavian countries are in a group called the ‘Like-Minded Countries’. These countries have invited Prime Minister Davutoğlu to Brussels on Dec. 17. The functioning of the mechanisms and visa exemption will be discussed at this meeting.”

<sup>47</sup> *Daily Sabah*, October 16, 2015, 8.

<sup>48</sup> *Daily Sabah*, October 16, 2015, 8.

<sup>49</sup> “Merkel shifts Turkey-EU stance on migrant crisis”, in *Daily News*, November 19, 2015, 9.

<sup>50</sup> Şahin Alpay, “What to expect of the EU?”, in *Today's Zaman*, November 02, 2015, A7.

<sup>51</sup> *Daily Sabah*, December 7, 2015, 8.

<sup>52</sup> Alex Barker, “EU and Turkey agree draft migrant deal”, in *Financial Times*, October 16, 2015, 2.

<sup>53</sup> Barker, “EU and Turkey agree”, 2.

<sup>54</sup> Barker, “EU and Turkey agree”, 2.

<sup>55</sup> Fritz W. Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*, (Boulder/CO/Oxford: Westview Press, 1997).

<sup>56</sup> Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, *Spieltheorie für Einsteiger*, (Stuttgart: Schäfer-Pöschel, 1997), 142.

<sup>57</sup> Dixit, Nalebuff, *Spieltheorie*, 142.

<sup>58</sup> Dixit, Nalebuff, *Spieltheorie*, 143.