Between Ethnic-Nationalism, Civic-Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Discourses on the Identity of the EU and the Debates on Turkey's Accession

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Abstract
This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the issue of collective identity in the EU, and its relation to the process of enlargement. Through an analysis of the European Parliament's (EP) debates on the accession of Turkey, I will show that the issue of European collective identity is essential for understanding the EP's position towards Turkey. I will explicate the view on inclusion and diversity in the EU, implicit in speeches made in the EP. My analysis will show that there is a complex, two-way relation between the members of the European parliament's (MEP) views on inclusion and diversity in the EU, and their position towards Turkey. Another conclusion has to do with the relation between state nationalism and European integration. My findings suggest that the EP is quite indifferent towards state-national identities and cultures, and does not see them as assets to be preserved.

Introduction
The study of EU-Turkey relations and the study of collective identity in the EU have hitherto progressed on separate parallel paths. Students of collective identity in the EU seem to agree that enlargement is in some way relevant to the understanding the EU’s identity, and students of EU-Turkey relations assume that the process of Turkey's accession is in some way related to issues of identity in the EU, but this relation has not been explored sufficiently (see the following literature review).

This paper hopes to constitute a step towards explicating the relation between the EU's collective identity and enlargement. It is a modest first step, focusing on the case of Turkey and on the specific issues of inclusion and diversity. However the analysis will suggest that there is a close, two-way relation between enlargement and identity and represents a call for
further studies of other enlargements, and other aspects of the EU’s collective identity in the context of enlargement. This would contribute not only to our understanding of European integration, but also to the more general context of the relation between a community's identity and its "others".

**EU-Turkey Relations**

I would like to open with a concise overview of EU-Turkey relations and the existing literature on it. There are fine historical reviews of EU-Turkey relations already available, one of the most detailed of which is Ozgul Erdemli's. For the present purpose a brief mentioning of the main turning-points will suffice. On September 11th 1959 Turkey was accepted as an associate member in the ECSC. In January 1982, in reaction to the coup-d'état the European communities suspended all relations with Turkey. Gradual re-democratization in Turkey led to a détente summit in 1986, in which Turkey announced its intentions to apply for full membership in the European communities. This announcement was actualized in April 1987 when Turkey submitted its membership application to the European council. The application was forwarded to the commission in accordance with the enlargement protocol. In 1989 the commission issued its opinion that consideration of Turkey's application should be postponed until after the establishment of a common European market. The report also pointed out to perceived substantial developmental and economic gaps between the European communities' members and Turkey. In December 1997, during the Luxembourg summit the council announced the countries which were to be included in the 2004 eastern enlargement. In reaction to its exclusion from the list, Turkey partially suspended its association with the EU. In 1999, in the Helsinki summit the council announced its recognition of Turkey's "accession eligibility" and recommended the formulation of a pre-accession strategy. This recommendation led to the EU-Turkey Accession Association adopted on March 8th 2001. The Copenhagen summit of 2002 confirmed the eastern enlargement without Turkey and rejected Turkey's demand for the formal announcement of the date in which accession negotiations were to be opened. This rejection was a mere temporary setback since accession negotiations were opened on December 17th 2004.

It is now apparent to the reader that EU-turkey relations has progressed in an instable and mixed fashion, taking two steps forward and one backwards. Nevertheless the relation did progress to the point of accession negotiations, the results of which remain unknown.

The attempts theorize and explain EU-Turkey relations can be divided into 4 subgroups: The first group includes studies which take the end-result of this relationship as their
main focus. These studies try to incorporate existing theories of international relations and international integration and predict the outcome of the accession negotiation. Such studies adopt either a Turkey-optimist$^3$ or a Turkey-skeptic$^4$ stance. Although these studies are worthy I believe any attempt to predict the end result of EU-turkey relations, as though it is predetermined by some independent variable, or even a group of such variables, is misguided (for further explanation of my position on this subject see the methodological section). Therefore one might benefit from the reasoning and conduct of such studies more than from their final conclusions. All of these studies agree that Turkey is a "special case" for the EU, its accession involving "extraordinarily complex issues", and all base their final conclusions on this judgment. This shows that the complexity of the relationship can be interpreted in a number of ways and should not be reduced to a cause-and-effect analysis leading to an inevitable result as its conclusion.

Another group of studies systematically analyze the conditions to accession presented by the EU to Turkey and the respective political and economic reforms in Turkey$^5$. While such studies are useful for our development of a better understanding of EU-Turkey relations, they clarify only a part of the picture, the legal-official declarative side, neglecting the discursive infrastructure of the relations. These studies too agree that Turkey is a unique EU candidate country. Therefore most of these studies seek to explain the supposedly either "tolerant" or "unfair" treatment which Turkey receives, based on Turkey being such a special case.

Yet another group of studies map out the mass and elite opinions, in Europe, on the prospect of Turkey's accession. Some of these studies try to point out to-, and explain, differences in opinions on the matter, between different countries$^6$. Others attempt to correlate political and social changes in Europe, such as the strengthening of social-democratic parties$^7$; the encounter between Turkish work-immigrants and European society$^8$; or the general opinion on the EU$^9$; with opinions on Turkey's accession. The current paper might add to the insights offered by each of these studies through the explication of the world-view which forms the basis of a given opinion on Turkey's accession.

The last and largest group of studies on EU-Turkey relations includes studies which focus on the pros-and-cons (for one or both sides) of Turkey's accession to the EU$^{10}$. Although some of these studies are quite admirable in scope, their appeals to the utilitarian calculations of decision-makers are testimony to a philosophical outlook which is quite different from the one underlying this paper. Moreover, the fact that different studies, conducted by different researchers, arrive at different conclusions, as to the utility of Turkey's
accession, shows that the advantages and disadvantages of the matter are open to interpretation. One person's advantage is another's disadvantage. We are forced then to return to the more basic, more complex question: how is a certain interpretation of EU-Turkey relations formed? What sort of concepts form the European "web of meaning" regarding Turkey's accession.

**Identity, Inclusion and Diversity in the EU**

This paper aims to contribute to the study of Identity in the EU through the analysis of the debates on Turkey's accession. Therefore I would like at this point to review briefly some of the literature on the issue of Identity in the EU. Different studies approach the subject of the EU's Identity from different angles and with different purposes in mind. In order to establish a sufficient understanding of the knowledge previously gained on the EU's Identity, and this essay's contribution to this knowledge, one might find it useful to discern between different studies according to their purpose and emphasis.

Some studies are dedicated to the systematic historical analysis of the idea of a common European Identity in the context of the project of European integration, or prior to it.\(^{11}\) For our current purpose, the most important conclusions arrived at by these studies is that the subject of Identity does occupy the EU, that the content and character of such an Identity is complex and constantly changing, and that the mere concept of European Identity involves a reference to "Others". Such Others include Eastern Europe, the US and the successor of the Ottoman empire- Turkey. This means that the EU develops its ideas about its own identity as opposed to the aforementioned Others. Bo Strath has also discovered that the concept of a common European identity, has developed from an instrument for promoting specific policies to an objective in its own right\(^{12}\).

A second and very large group of studies is dedicated to evaluating the relation between state-national identity and European Identity in the EU. Some of Weiler's\(^ {13}\) and Habermas'\(^ {14}\) work address this issue, as well Ericksen's\(^ {15}\) Folesdal's\(^ {16}\), and many more. It well accedes the scope of this paper to try to summarize the conclusions arrived at by each student. However, it is important to underline that the vigorous debate on this subject shows that the relation between European Identity and state-national Identity is not necessarily a "zero-sum" game. In other words a common European Identity and the separate state-national identities might complement each other and assist to conserve European cultures in an age of cultural globalization\(^ {17}\). This means that the question of Inclusion and Diversity in the EU remains open. If there is no automatic relation between national and continental identity, no
predetermined model (be it National or Supra-national) for it, than the answers to these questions, and the questions of Inclusion and Diversity must be constructed through the day-to-day institutional practice of the EU. However, as De-Beus had already pointed out\textsuperscript{18}, most of the studies on these subjects tend to adopt a theoretical-normative perspective. They focus on the question what form a common European Identity \textit{ought} to take. Few studies examine the ideas about a common European Identity embedded in what the EU \textit{does and says}. These few studies usually examine relatively narrow case studies\textsuperscript{19}, thus they cannot offer a broader understanding, or monitor changes in the EU’s discourse or web of meaning regarding identity\textsuperscript{20}. Through the current paper, I hope to contribute to the development of such an understanding.

\textbf{Methodology}

The purpose of this paper is to explicate the perceptions of Inclusion and Diversity implicit in the MEPs argumentations in the debates on Turkey’s accession. This endeavor is based on the assumption that the MEPs' concepts regarding Inclusion and Diversity in the EU are constructed through a dialogue with the European political-cultural tradition. This assumption is inspired by Gadamer\textsuperscript{21}, and his perception of human existence as a constant dialogue with tradition. Gadamer also provides the basis for the proposed exploration of the philosophical-ethical ideas about Inclusion and Diversity implicit in the EP's debates. Gadamer, and Taylor\textsuperscript{22} call upon us to unite Ethic and Praxis, to embrace a strong, qualitative evaluation of human action. As Gibbons articulately phrased this typical hermeneutical argument:"because social behavior and institutions are in large part constituted by the concepts, ideas, and beliefs available to actors, explanation of social action must be cast in terms of those factors"\textsuperscript{23}.

The central question in the current paper is then: What kind of ideas about Inclusion and Diversity provide the philosophical basis of argumentations on Turkey’s accession made in the EP in the years leading to the opening of accession negotiations? In the following paragraphs I will explain the strategy I incorporated in my attempt to answer this question.

In order to answer this question this paper will analyze the debates of the EP on Turkey. The analysis will include all the debates, whose titles mentioned Turkey, in the relevant period (1995-2004). The analysis will also include the background documents of the debates: motions for resolutions and reports. One group of debates will be excluded from the analysis: the debates surrounding the earthquake which occurred in 1999 in Turkey, and the following EU’s humanitarian aid to Turkey. The rationale behind the exclusion of these debates is that they do not deal directly with the accession of Turkey and so they are less
relevant to the questions of Inclusion and Diversity. In total, 20 debates will be analyzed in this paper.

The analysis will be conducted in three stages; In the first stage theoretical literature on Inclusion and Diversity is incorporated to formulate an Inclusion axis and a Diversity axis. The inclusion axis runs from Ethnic-Nationalism to Universal-Cosmopolitanism with Civic-Nationalism and Supra-National-Cosmopolitanism in between. The diversity axis runs from Communitarianism to Postmodern-Multiculturalism with Liberal-Communitarianism and Liberal-Multiculturalism as intermediate options. Each approach was broken into its most basic themes. (See table 1- the inclusion axis and table 2- the diversity axis) This presentation of the various approaches should not be understood as a complete summary of the entire philosophical outlook, but as a summary of their teachings on the specific issues of Inclusion and Diversity. Another important clarification is that the separation of the Inclusion aspect and the Diversity aspect is designed to discern between two important questions: one is how rigid the boundaries of a community are and the other is how open that community is to Difference. There is no doubt that in practice the answers to these two questions are intertwined, but I believe that the theoretical distinction makes the analysis more lucid and systematic.

Table 1- The Inclusion axis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the essence of the community?</th>
<th>Ethnic-Nationalism(^{24})</th>
<th>Civic-Nationalism(^{25})</th>
<th>Supra-National Cosmopolitanism(^{26})</th>
<th>Universal Cosmopolitanism(^{27})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An organic, primordial, pre-political community</td>
<td>A community that is founded on Constitutional Patriotism</td>
<td>A loose community of flexible communities</td>
<td>A universal community of individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the duty of the political system?</td>
<td>To express the particular heritage of an organic primordial, pre-political community</td>
<td>To give legal-institutional expression to the Constitutional Patriotism</td>
<td>To insure distributive justice</td>
<td>To insure equality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 2009
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the outlook on the relation between historical-cultural heritage and Politics?</th>
<th>Seen as the essence of- and as the source of legitimacy for- the organized political community</th>
<th>Cultural heritage may be the historical reason for political organization, but once the community is formed, the heritage becomes politically secondary to Constitutional Patriotism</th>
<th>Acknowledges the heritage's importance for each of the communities</th>
<th>The heritage is seen as politically irrelevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do new members join the community?</td>
<td>On the basis of perceived kinship</td>
<td>On the basis of respect for the principals of Constitutional Patriotism</td>
<td>According to the community is possible through membership in the comprising communities</td>
<td>Every human being is automatically seen as a member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the relation to Others?</td>
<td>Varies from condescending to alienating</td>
<td>Respect towards those share the commitment to Constitutional Patriotism</td>
<td>Appreciation and enjoyment of Otherness and diversity</td>
<td>There is no Other. Only Universal solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second stage the speeches were analyzed for the purpose of tracing argumentations that correspond to the themes of the Inclusion axis and the Diversity axis. In this stage each speech was treated as a whole text-unit in itself and separated from other speeches.

In the third stage, speeches were grouped according to their orientation with regard to Inclusion and Diversity, each group thereby forming a reasonably comprehensive outlook on Inclusion and Diversity in the EU. This stage was applied on each debate as a whole. It is important to clarify that my purpose is not to "uncover" a "subjective intention" allegedly "concealed" in the text. I argue, with Gibbons that: "to speak of ideas, concepts and so on simply as subjective intentions of actors is to fail to see that the ideas are themselves
embedded in the practices or the way of life in question; we must go beyond the subjective intentions of actors to the intersubjective and common meanings

Table 2- The Diversity Axis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the vision of the proper society?</th>
<th>Communitarianism</th>
<th>Liberal Communitarianism</th>
<th>Liberal Multi-Culturalism</th>
<th>Postmodern Multi-Culturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensual, conservative, homogenous</td>
<td>Just, with a culturally embedded concept of justice</td>
<td>A society that is committed to defending and preserving cultural minorities</td>
<td>A society without social categorization, in which people are engaged in constant identity plays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the accepted Level of diversity in the community?</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Limited by a specific cultural heritage</th>
<th>Limited by the demand for respect of minorities</th>
<th>Unlimited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| How open to change is the community? | Very low | Low | Medium | High |

The strategy described above was heavily influenced by Charles Taylor. Taylor has established the argument that an understanding of human phenomena can only be reached through a context-sensitive, holistic research scheme. According to Taylor studies focused on human phenomena should not attempt to disintegrate the social web of meaning which forms the basis of human action. This is the reason why we refrained from any "codification" or "operationalization" of the philosophical approaches. The Inclusion and Diversity axis should not be understood as attempts at such codification, but rather as a formulation of ideal types of Inclusion and Diversity. Instead I phrased the typical answers each approach gives to thematic questions. These answers are derived from pervious literature. This method enables the analysis to remain true to the meaning of the speeches and is inspired by Gadadmer's and Taylor's question-and-answer approach to text interpretation.
As the last methodological remark, I find it necessary to clarify that in the following analysis the quotes are merely examples brought to help make my point. They are not exhaustive in the sense that similar argumentations were made in the parliament and could not be brought here due to length limitation.

**Analysis of the Debates on Turkey's Accession**

The debates on Turkey's accession in the years 1995-2004 can be divided into two groups: The first group includes debates which I label as "responsive debates". These are debates which were initiated by the parliament as responses to certain political events in Turkey. Such events as arrests of journalists, violent or forceful dispersal of demonstrations and actions taken against human rights activists and NGOs, were perceived by the EP as events which warrant a discussion and some kind of a reaction by the EU. The second group of debates which I label as "initiative debates" include debates which were conducted as part of the accession process and which discuss the compatibility, or lack thereof, between the political accession criteria and the political situation in Turkey. I will show that the concepts of Inclusion and Diversity implicit in each group of debates are quite different from one another.

In the first group of debates I discerned between Civic-National-Communitarian voices and Cosmopolitan voices. It is worth mentioning that the Cosmopolitan argumentations tended to be less consistent in their specific -Supra National or Universal- orientation, and in their orientation with regard to Diversity, than the Civic-National argumentations. In the second group of debates the EP was split into Civic-Nationalists and Ethnic-Nationalists. This split was stable and consistent throughout the "initiative debates" in the analyzed period.

*Responsive Debates: Between "European" Principles and "Natural" Human Rights*

As short as month after the approval of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, a series of debates, dealing with political events in Turkey, were conducted. In all of these debates the EP repeatedly reminded Turkey that:'(The European parliament's) positive vote on the Customs Union with Turkey was accompanied by an insistent appeal made by the European parliament for Turkey to adhere to the principles of Freedom, Democracy and respect of fundamental freedoms and rule of law'35

The above quote refers to the principles of the Constitutional Patriotism (CP) which characterizes Civic-Nationalism. The European parliament refers to the legal relations between the EU and Turkey (the Customs Union) as the basis for its demand that Turkey adhere to the principles of CP. For the EP the basis of the Customs Union is a supposedly
common commitment to these principles. Thus, breaking with these principles reflects upon the Customs union. Moreover, the EP sees it as its duty to function as a guardian of the principles of the European CP. This perception is also in harmony with Civic-Nationalism: ’We in Europe, the European Parliament, have a duty to maintain the pressure on Turkey only then can Turkey be made to understand (that) it will have to conform to our common principles and values’\(^{36}\).

Also in harmony with Civic-Nationalism, religion (as part of cultural heritage), is perceived as secondary to political principles, in determining the EU’s relations with Turkey: ’It is impossible for this country to be able to join the EU if it fails to respect human rights. It is not that the Christian club does not want an Islamic country’\(^{37}\). Another point which is clarified by this quote is that there is no automatic correlation between adopting a Civic-National concept of Inclusion in the EU, and a certain, positive or negative, standpoint on the question of Turkey's accession. The speaker quoted holds a Civic-National view of the EU and is opposed to Turkey's accession.

These quoted speeches formulate a perception which sees the adherence to the principles of CP as the fundamental condition for joining the EU. Such a position limits the degree of Diversity within the community because according to it there is a place in the community only for peoples and countries who share a respect for certain moral and political principles. Therefore this perception cannot be seen as a Multicultural perception of the EU.

The perceived basis and reference point of the community's common principles are official documents of the EU and the European communities. This is apparent from the fact that most of the motions for resolutions which refer to the principles of Democracy, Human rights and the Rule of law, open with references to such documents as the European convention on the protection of human rights, the Barcelona declaration and the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement. It seems reasonable to claim then, that these principles are seen as European principles, as principles to which the EU, its institutions and its citizens, are especially attached. This perception corresponds with the Liberal-Communitarian call for a just society, with a culturally embedded perception of justice. It seems then, that it is possible to amalgamate certain speeches and motions for resolution, made in the EP, in reaction to political events in Turkey, into a consistent and comprehensive perception of Inclusion and Diversity in the EU. This perception addresses most of the thematic issues which we formulated as characteristic of Civic-Nationalism in the Inclusion aspect, and Liberal-Communitarianism in the Diversity aspect.
The second approach to Inclusion and Diversity in the EU, which I identified in the "responsive" debates, is the Cosmopolitan approach. As I mentioned these voices are less consistent in their specific-Supra National or Universal-orientation and in their ideas regarding Diversity. What this group of speeches and documents have in common is that in determining the reaction to the political events in Turkey they turn to supposedly "basic natural human principles" rather than "European principles and documents". There is no reference to the Customs Union or any other official European document as the basis for demands such as improving conditions in prisons, or enabling free expression. It seems then that such documents take for granted that Turkish citizens deserve freedom of expression and better conditions in prisons, not because they are potential EU citizens, by the mere fact that they are human beings. Furthermore, speakers and authors who adopt this view turn, in certain cases, to official global-international documents such as UN charters and international treaties. It seems then that the basis for these demands is a perception of basic Human rights which every person, throughout the world, as such, deserves. MEP's commitment to advocating these rights is a demonstration of a general and automatic (in the sense that it does not depend on political institutions and arrangements), human solidarity. Such a commitment is explicitly stated in a number of documents; for example in two motions for resolutions, tabled in reaction to an initiative to introduce a new press law which would restrict the freedom of the press in Turkey, the parliament recalls 'its commitment to freedom of the press' and 'its opposition to all attempts to muzzle and censure the press'.

At this point I would like to Summarize my analysis of the Cosmopolitan voice according to the formulation I suggested in table 1; Its rhetoric of fundamental human rights, deserved equally by all humans as citizens of the world, regardless of national belonging and regardless of their formal status vis-à-vis the EU, suggests the typical Universal-Cosmopolitan perception of a universal community of human beings. Every Human being is seen as an equal member of the Universal community, equally deserving basic rights. Advocates of Cosmopolitanism see the EP as an institution which is committed to the task of protecting and promoting human rights in every country regardless of its status in the EU. This refers to the last two points in table 1. (i.e. to the typical perception of every human being as a potential member of the community and the universal solidarity which erases all discernments between "us" and "others").

However, the issue of Cultural heritage complicates this seemingly clear-cut analysis; in most of the debates the advocates of the Cosmopolitan approach seem indifferent to the issue of culture, in other words they ignore it altogether. This corresponds with Universal-
Cosmopolitanism which sees culture as politically irrelevant. However in two debates (one following an uprising of Kurd prisoners in Turkish prisons and another following the bombing of a church in Istanbul), the speakers who spoke of a universal community of human subjects of rights, accentuated two important aspects of this community. The first aspect is that one of the fundamental human rights is the right to express one's identity freely. The second aspect is that this community should foster 'mutual esteem of the religious and cultural traditions of its people'. These references to identity and cultural heritage as important components of a world-wide human community, seem to fit Supra-National-Cosmopolitanism better than Universal-Cosmopolitanism. These two debates also complicate our analysis of the Cosmopolitans' standing on the issue of Diversity. It seems that the perception of a just world-society as one that protects and promotes human rights, fits the Liberal-Communitarian call for a just society with a culturally embedded concept of justice. The perception of justice as "human rights" is embedded in the western enlightenment heritage- it is a culturally embedded one. The call for respect of human rights throughout the world, brings with it limitations on the degree of Diversity in acceptable perceptions of the good. This limitation is in harmony with Liberal-Communitarianism. However in the two aforementioned debates the Cosmopolitan view seems to be promoting Diversity and respect of minorities which are characteristic of Liberal-Multiculturalism. These complexities led me to characterize the Cosmopolitan view as less consistent and less crystallized than the Civic-National one. I will discuss these findings in the discussion section. I will now turn to the analysis of the "initiative debates"

Initiative Debates: Can the EU and Turkey Progress Towards One-Another

In this section I will analyze the debates which took place as part of the Enlargement process and discussed the "progress towards accession" reports. As mentioned above, in these debates the Parliament was divided into Civic-Nationalist-Liberal-Communitarians and Ethnic-Nationalist-Communitarians. Here too, the split between Civic-Nationalists and Ethnic-Nationalists did not correspond directly with a positive or negative opinion on the prospect of Turkey's accession. Some Civic-Nationalists appose Turkey's accession because they claim that the country fails to meet the standards of the European CP.

The Civic-National-Liberal-Communitarian view is manifested, quite consistently in the "progress towards accession" reports that were submitted and approved in the parliament in this period. These reports assess Turkey's eligibility for accession according to its implementation of the accession criteria which is based on the principles of CP. These reports'
standing on the question of Turkey's accession is generally positive provided that Turkey will (continue to) implement the accession criteria. Such a position is in harmony with the Civic-National-Liberal-Communitarian view which we outlined in the previous section. Another position which is in harmony with this view but is opposed to Turkey's accession, is manifested in the following quote: 'The chief obstacle to Turkey's accession is not prejudice or discrimination. The EU is not a Christian club. The chief obstacle to Turkey's entry is its inability to meet the political criteria laid down at Copenhagen, especially regarding democracy and human rights' (we) must not say yet that Turkey is on track to join.\textsuperscript{45}

In contrast to that view, the Ethnic-National-Communitarian outlook, sees the European community as an organic pre-political community, and the EU as its contemporary materialization. This is evident in the fact that advocates of this perception formulate a set of informal accession criteria in addition to the formal one. The additional accession criteria are very different from the formal ones and replace the formal political principles with geographic, historical and religious ones: 'Given its geographic location, its culture and religion, I cannot ever imagine this country forming an integral part of the European community with its Judaeo-Christian tradition.'\textsuperscript{46} For advocates of such a position, the EU is seen as the embodiment of a community that shares primordial features. Common political principle are seen as secondary, even marginal. Thus, membership in the EU is, or should be, based on such organic features. The EP's duty is to insure the prosperity of the primordial community it represents. This includes protecting the cultural heritage and the community from potential "intruders" who might weaken it: 'One day the European Union will simply have to decide where its borders are. The Union cannot be a kind of vague area that all of its neighbors can enter on the sole condition that they abide by a few rules that are interpreted fairly generally... (Otherwise) the Union will continue to spread like an oil stain. It will not be truly consistent; it will have no structure and it will have no objective' \textsuperscript{47} We will have created the Europe of the diplomats, but not the Europe of our peoples.

The speaker believes that the well-being of the EU requires clearly defined borders that are based on something other than vague political principles. The argument implicit here is that the EU's borders should be defined according to pre-political, cultural, religious, or geographic criteria.

The cultural heritages of the European nations are seen in this view as the essence of the community and the basis of its legitimacy. Any attempt to extend the community beyond the current borders (the countries of eastern Europe are seen to be already included in the community since they have been granted official candidate status), is perceived as: '
internationalist delusions which seek to extend the Union indefinitely, without taking national identity into account. The EU must rid itself from such delusions if it is to be true to its duty.

The following quote exemplifies the perception of a possession of certain organic traits as the main and rigid criterion for membership, which is one of the components of Ethnic-Nationalism as outlined above in table 1: 'We take it for granted that the EU consists of European states, Turkey can never become a member, for a country cannot transform itself into a European state, no matter how much it wishes to do so'. If a country, and its people, cannot become European one must assume they would have to be born European. Thus it seems the speaker is implying that membership in the European community should be determined and based on kinship of some kind. Another feature of Ethnic-Nationalism as I defined it here, is an alienating or patronizing relation to Others. The following quote exemplifies the relation of the speakers that we identified as Ethnic-Nationalists towards Turkey: 'Turkey and the EU are two widely different civilizations whose values are incompatible. There is a reason for Turkey's countless problems, and that reason is a civilization that has damaging effects upon the development of society. The 'Turkish civilization' is described as having a negative effect on society. The supposed inferiority of this civilization is not completely concealed in this description.

I believe that the reader now sees that all the components of Ethnic-Nationalism described in table 1 are manifested in the EP in the initiative debates. In terms of the diversity axis I labeled this perception as a Communitarian one. I will now turn to justify this label. In contrast to Liberal-Communitariansm, Communitarianism sees the "proper" or "good" society as a consensual and homogenous one (see table 2). The Ethnic-National-Communitarian view of the European community, perceives consensus and homogeneity in the EU, as the most important factors in determining its relation to Turkey: 'We wish to avoid migration-related conflicts, we should not turn a Muslim country into the European Union's largest member state. This could give rise to civil unrest, something we should be endeavoring to prevent in Europe'. It should be emphasized in this context that any member of the EP, regardless of their views on Inclusion and Diversity, may see the prevention of social unrest as an important consideration. However, for MEP's who hold an Ethnic-National-Communitarian view, this is the most important consideration in determining whether or not to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Earlier in this speech, the MEP pointed out the advantages that Turkey's accession might carry for the EU, but he believes that the risk of social unrest surmounts these advantages. Another feature of the
Communitarian view of the good society is homogeneity. The following quote illustrates the Communitarian negative position regarding diversity: 'May I remind you of the multitude of races housed many centuries ago in the Tower of Babel. It fell. If you too wish Europe to fall, bring 80 million Turks with a different culture and different religion into Europe'. In this view, not only would the EU gain nothing by the Diversity that Turkey's accession might add to it, the EU would be damaged by it. A typical Communitarian justification for its resistance to Diversity, is that there is a contradiction between Diversity and solidarity. Such a view was also expressed in the EP: 'Should Turkey join the European Union, this enlargement might prove fatal and Europeans might lose their identity, it might be detrimental to the sense of being a to which solidarity in the European Union is founded. MEP who hold a communitarian concept of the EU, reject the notion of Diversity as a normative principle. They see it as an impediment to integration, and believe that diversity in the EU should be kept to a necessary minimum and certainly not be encouraged and promoted as such.

The last component of Communitariansm as we described it, is its basic hostility to change. By this I mean that Communitarians hold very dearly a given community's way of life and perception of the good, and believe that it should be preserved. This view was not expressed in the parliament in so many words, but I did find references to the EU's founding fathers as justification to opposing Turkey's accession on the grounds that it is not a European country (in the Ethnic-National sense of "Europeanness"): 'If the ghosts of Adenauer, de Gaulle and Spaak were in the House, they would shiver merely at the idea of what we are debating here... Since when has Turkey been in Europe?' Or another variation: 'We are opposed in principle to Turkish accession. As General de Gaulle remarked, there is no getting away from the facts. Geographically historically and culturally, Turkey is not a European country. It is important to clarify that these founding fathers are only mentioned to justify the Ethnic-National-Communitarian view. It seems reasonable to conclude then, that MEPs who hold this view feel that de Gaulle's or Adenauer's supposed objection to Turkey's accession, provides sufficient justification to their own position on the subject. They take for granted that the EU should, and the EP wants to, adhere to de Gaulle's and Adenauer's ideas on European integration. There is more than a hint of Conservatism in this view.

Before discussing the meaning of the findings described above I would now like to summarize them. I found that 3 concepts of the EU's identity can be identified in the EP's debates on Turkey's accession between 1995 and 2004. The first is a Civic-National-Liberal-Communitarian concept. The second is an Ethnic-National-Communitarian concept. The third is a Cosmopolitan concept, whose position on Diversity seemed in some debates closer to
Liberal-Multiculturalism and in others closer to Liberal-Communitarianism. Table 3 summarizes and sharpens the differences between these 3 concepts. Through this systematic comparison of the 3 concepts I wish to show that while on certain issues some concepts may seem similar, on the whole the concepts are quite distinct.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How is the EP perceived?</th>
<th>Civic-National-Liberal-Communitarianism</th>
<th>Ethnic-National-Communitarianism</th>
<th>Universal-Cosmopolitanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegator of a community which maintains CP.</td>
<td>Delegator of a geographically-defined community with a common cultural, historical and religious heritage.</td>
<td>Delegator of a universal human-community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the duty of the EP?</td>
<td>To express and assert the CP</td>
<td>To preserve stability, consensus, and cultural, religious and geographic homogeneity and coherence.</td>
<td>To promote equality among all women and men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is the judgment of the political situation in Turkey formed?</td>
<td>Through Normative judgment according to the principles of CP.</td>
<td>The specific political situation is perceived as secondary to Turkey's essential incompatibility with the EU's nature.</td>
<td>Through a sense of solidarity towards the people in Turkey, and aim to insure the protection of their human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is Turkey's perceived position in relation to the EU?</td>
<td>Turkey has a distinct status which is defined by the EU's formal documents, and should be judged accordingly.</td>
<td>Turkey cannot become a member of the EU.</td>
<td>Turkey has no special position. (Since all states are potential members).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion and Conclusions

Now that I have clarified the difference between the 3 concepts of the identity of the EU, I would like to point out to a number of conclusions that can be derived from this analysis. First of all I believe the reader is now convinced that in its dealing with the question of Turkey's accession the EP does engage in an ethical debate on the EU's identity, and on Inclusion and Diversity in the EU. The EP's conduct vis-à-vis Turkey are not based solely on questions of interest and utility. However there is no crystallized and consistent concept of Inclusion and Diversity guiding the EP in its decisions. This difficulty was not solved by any of the EU's official documents which supposedly laid down guiding principles on the issue of Turkey's accession and enlargement in general. The debates on Turkey's accession involve a debate on the most basic questions of a political organization such as what does it stands for, and who does it represent. This shows that the EP's conduct in relation to Turkey, and perhaps in relation to enlargement in general, is at least partially influenced by discursive-patterns formulated in the parliament. In other words the practice is influenced by the discourse. Notwithstanding this insight, the analysis also suggests that the discourse is influenced by the practice; the ideas about Inclusion and Diversity manifested in the EP, change when different practical questions are debated. Therefore the analysis presented here demonstrates, in a lucid and tangible way, the two-way, circular relation between ethics, or ethical discourse on one hand, and practice on the other.

However in the context of the relation between practice and web-of-meaning, one question still remains open and it is a valid one: Are the specific divisions in the EP, presented in this paper, regarding Inclusion and Diversity in the EU, the result of the specific context examined here- i.e. the question of Turkey's accession and the specific complexities it brings with it? In order to determine whether these divisions in the EP exceed the specific issue of Turkey's accession, further analysis is needed, beginning with the debates on other enlargements. This study then should be understood more as a call for further study than as the bottom-line.

I would also like to address the difference between the responsive and the initiative debates. The appearances of the Cosmopolitan voice in the former and the Ethnic-National voice in the later suggest, that while on the declarative level the EP is an enthusiastic advocate of human rights and adopts the broadest degree of Inclusion, it is unwilling or unable to translate its enthusiasm to practical steps towards Turkey's accession. Sure enough parliamentarians express a sense of commitment to the Turkish people against the Turkish government when the latter violates (or is considered to be violating) the people's rights. But
this sense of commitment disappears, or significantly weakens, when the EP is called to stand by the Turks and support the process of Turkey's accession. In debating practical steps towards Turkey's accession the division between Civic-Nationalists and Cosmopolitans becomes a debate between Civic-Nationalists and Ethnic-Nationalist. The entire debate is shifted to the right side of the Inclusion axis, becoming less inclusive.

The inconsistency between the ideas on identity embedded in each group of debates should not however be understood as particularly surprising or problematic. It is not inconceivable that a political organization would have a multi-faceted self understanding and encompass differing conceptions of its goals and purposes. Based on the findings presented here, it can be suggested, that the EP regards itself both as the bearer of the flag of universal human rights and as the delegator of a European community. The European community, according to the findings presented here, is constituted through CP, or certain common primordial features, or a combination of both. Turkey is included in the EP's perceived mission to promote human rights but excluded from the European community. These conceptions of the EU's identity are not necessarily contradictory. This is especially true if the discourse of human rights is read as a creation of European enlightenment. In such a reading the sense of duty expressed by the EP for promoting human rights is understood as a reasonable outcome of the commitment to the European community's perception of the good. Such a reading can also help explain the dominance of the Civic-National-Liberal-Communitarian voice. This voice appears in all debates, both responsive and initiative throughout the examined period. Moreover, it is the only voice which appears not only in speeches but also in official reports submitted and approved in the parliament. It seems then that the language and terms of Civic-National-Liberal-Communitarianism is more able to construct, grasp, and give expression to a common ground between the three conceptions of the EU's identity, than the other two. This common ground is sufficient for carrying out the EP's tasks as long as it is not compelled to arrive at a final decision on Turkey's accession. Cosmopolitanism's and Ethnic-Nationalism's bottom line standpoint towards Turkey are irreconcilable. Decisions-time then would be a crucial, constitutive moment in the identity construction process of the EU.

It is also worth pointing out, that one of the features of the common ground between these three conceptions is that they all involve a certain degree of patronism towards Turkey. Whether expressed implicitly in terms of a mission to promote human rights in Turkey, or in the demand that Turkey adhere to European political principles (CP), or more implicitly in the
rejection of Turkey that is based on its supposed inferiority, it seems that MEP share a patronizing view of Turkey.

It is important to emphasize that the outcomes of decision-time regarding Turkey's accession cannot and should not be predicted based on the findings I presented, for example the dominance of Civic-Nationalism. More than anything my findings suggest that there is no linear cause-and-effect relation between the MEP's position on the question of Turkey's accession and the ideas about Inclusion and Diversity implicit in their speeches. The terms and concepts of Civic-National-Liberal-Communitarianism were incorporated in the debates to justify both an optimist and a skeptic standpoint on the issue of Turkey's accession. In other words the existence of a dominant voice in the parliament regarding Inclusion and Diversity, which supersedes the differences on specific policies shows, that MEP's do not simply employ the terms of the approach best fitting to justify their opinion on the policy-question debated. If this was the case we would expect for example that the Cosmopolitan voice would be utilized to justify a positive stand on Turkey's accession, the Ethnic-National to justify a negative stand and the Civic-National to justify a "maybe" position. But this is not the case. Civic-National concepts were employed to rationalize a "yes", a "no", and a "maybe" answer to the question of Turkey's accession. What all this means, in terms of predicting where EU-Turkey relations are headed, is that there is no breaking out of the ethic-practice cycle through which both the relations and the EU's self understanding is constructed. The outcome of the accession negotiations with Turkey and the model of Inclusion and Diversity proper for the EU, would both have to be constructed through open debates on these subjects, and not prior to them. This insight underlines the important role that the EP has, or should have, in the EU's enlargement process, if it is to be truly democratic.

Returning to the question of the relation between state-nationalism and European Integration; the only approaches to Inclusion and Diversity which see state nationalism as a desirable, positive feature of European Integration are Supra-National-Cosmopolitanism and Liberal-Multiculturalism. We can conclude, based on the marginality of the Supra-National-Cosmopolitan and Liberal-Multicultural voices that, at best, the EP does not seek to preserve state nationalism. The EP does not see state nationalism as a positive and desirable feature of the European community, even if it does not openly and overtly rejects it.

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NOTES

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Weiler’s work on the European court of justice’s rulings is an exception to that rule.


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