Causes for Participation in hegemonic Governance

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Abstract
This article argues that the causes for participation in Global Governance are to be found in part in the mere structure of it. In the debate about Global Governance, largely, the issue of power is neglected. However, we certainly deal with a hegemonic constellation. Therefore, the power is present and exerted in Global Governance. It is argued here, that the exertion of power in Global Governance by the United States is causal for participation in it. The study looks at the Global Governance of Counterterrorism, i.e. the Global War on Terrorism, and the regional organizations of ASEAN and the EU.

Participation in Hegemonic Governance
Why is there participation in Global Governance? This was the research question that this research started with.

It can be assumed that generally Global Governance is a natural outcome of Globalization. Global Governance thus is a group phenomenon. States engage in multilateral ordering activities in order to deal with the new transnational issues that are posed by globalization and its accompanying interdependence. Interdependence thus leads to cooperation and participation in Global Governance. Yet, I assume that it is not that simple. There might be more and different reasons for participation in Global Governance and this thesis is set out to research on these. So, the central question is after “root causes” of participation in Global Governance. Why is it that actors engage in this common pursuit? What are the reasons? Whereas it could be argued, that Global Governance as such is a necessary result of globalization, participation in Global Governance is not an automatic result only of interdependence but has its distinct causes and motivations. Other factors might
play a role in participation in this common pursuit of states. What are these factors? This was the question pursued in this research project.

There is the need for further research on participation and the causes thereof in Global Governance. Results on these issues are lacking in the current literature. It is important to ask about participation in Global Governance in order to understand the mechanisms and processes that lead to this common pursuit of states and to be able to influence and work towards a better functioning, hence more participation, in it. If Global Governance is indeed the model for world politics in the future, we need a better understanding of how it can be achieved, constructed and spread. The different actors in the world - not only, but also, states - it is argued, will need to cooperate anyway in order to solve such diverse global problems as climate change, health challenges, migration, and global violence (terrorism being one part of it). It will be useful to know how this cooperation can be brought about, which causal mechanisms it depends on. Therefore, this research is looking particularly at the CAUSES of participation in Global Governance. This research will be as important for future politics as the research on the causes of peace is for the future or a peaceful world.

Participation
There is not much literature about participation in Global Governance to be found, however, the main results of existing research shall be presented here.

Auer writes about “Who participates in Global Governance” and contends that it is not only states and international organizations, but also NGOs who participate in this shared project. However, it is the states and state-derived institutions that make the rules: “The supremacy of state and state-derived institutions in international environmental rule-making is amply illustrated by research on international environmental regimes” (Auer). Still, nonstate actors play a role: “Nonstate actors are major players, too – creating, assembling and disseminating knowledge, and lobbying for regional and global environmental protection” (Auer), even if a possibly minor one:

“Other students of global civil society contend that while NGOs and other non-state actors are increasingly politically savvy and are insinuating themselves in global environmental problem-solving institutions, these entities are less successful than states in reaching into and influencing the lives of ordinary citizens, and that global civil society is unlikely to replace the state system as the main source of global environmental governance” (ibid).
He comes to the conclusion, that global environmental governance is a multi-level, multi-actor process, and “one that bridges local, national, and supranational environmental and policy contexts.” (Auer).

Fisher and Green also wrote about participation in Global Governance at the case of civil society and developing countries. They come to the conclusion that “though both groups are widely perceived as critical for the creation and implementation of effective international policy for sustainable development, developing countries and representatives of civil society still face obstacles that impede their participation in the multilateral arena” (Fisher and Green, 66). They start to develop a model for understanding the degree of political engagement of those two actors in global governance. The first factor is disenfranchisement, which describes the fact that “despite their legal standing, developing countries are still frequently unable to exercise the level of influence they wish and to achieve their desired outcomes” (Fisher and Green 69). Realities of multilateral processes create barriers to participation of those two actors, such as for example limited resources and personnel, lack of training and so forth. In the case of civil society disenfranchisement refers to their perceived legitimacy and the organizational forms that they take. As factors contributing to disenfranchisement they single out: endogenous resources, transnational connectivity, and geopolitical status. This model is then used to study the extent of disenfranchisement in participation of developing countries and civil society representatives.

Thirdly, Nanz and Steffek write about “Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere”. Herein, they argue that participation of NGOs in the case of the WTO would enhance its legitimacy and accountability.

“we explore the possibility of democratic and legitimate decision-making at the global level – in both its normative and its analytical dimensions – from the perspective of a deliberative theory of politics. This theory claims that democratic legitimation can be generated by means of deliberation between a variety of social actors (e.g. government officials from different national communities, scientific experts, NGOs, etc.). Political decisions are reached through a deliberative process where participants scrutinize heterogeneous interests and justify their positions in view of the common good of a given constituency. In our view, any bestowal of democratic legitimacy on global governance must ultimately depend on the creation of an appropriate public sphere, i.e. an institutionalized arena for (deliberative) political participation beyond the limits of national boundaries. Moreover, we argue that actors from organized civil society play an important role in the creation of a public sphere” (Nanz and Steffek 315).
Therefore, the argument is made, that civil society participation enhances legitimacy of global governance, this is argued exemplary at the case of the WTO.

Clark and others researched on NGO participation in UN World Conferences, and Gordenker and Weiss on “NGO participation in the international policy process”, however, this research never addressed the causes of participation and was limited on civil society actors alone. Also civil society was addressed in Loys article on “Public Participation in the World Trade Organization”.

The only article found that addressed the question of states participation in Global Governance was Sassens “The Participation of States and Citizens in Global Governance”. However, even here it is much more written on citizenship and the participatory opportunities for citizens due to the denationalization of the state, than about causes of participation by states actors themselves.

I started from the assumption, that Global Governance is not a heterarchical phenomenon, as it is often described in the literature. Heterarchical global governance is a highly normatively laden term, which fails to describe the reality of global cooperation accurately. On the contrary, global governance shows marks of power, particularly unipolarity. As we currently debate a lot about unipolarity, hegemony and empire, the factor of power – which is central to these terms – cannot be ignored when writing about global governance. That is why I think it makes sense to speak of hegemonic governance here.

Hegemony

Hegemony in principle is different from „Empire“ as it is debated currently in International Relations. Still the term hegemony is the older term to describe power within international relations. Already Realism knew the theory of hegemonic stability. This theory describes that under anarchy a hegemon can secure peace and stability between states. He takes over the task that otherwise could be fulfilled only by a world government: to represent a supreme power – possibly with a monopoly of force – that has the possibility to sanction states. Aberrant behaviour thus can be punished and peaceful and orderly behaviour thus be implemented.

Here, we get an idea what hegemony might mean. It implies a superior power position of one state – based on hard and soft power – within international relations. The United States long term served as a candidate for this role. It was assumed, that the US are a benign hegemon. This refers to the fact or perception that hegemony is to a greater extent based on the application of soft power compared to hard power. What we know as globalization is an effect
of this benign hegemony, or at least was facilitated by it. The United States applying soft power spread their ideals of liberalism and free trade around the world. In fact, hegemony then as well as now is and was not only based on soft power. Repeatedly, hard power is applied to pursue interests. The interventions in Afghanistan as well as Iraq are the most recent examples.

**Hegemonic governance**

The term „hegemonic governance“ serves to introduce the factor of power into the discussion about Global Governance. This implies that we are not dealing with – as is implicitly often assumed, especially in the normative concepts – an egalitarian form of global governance. States, which are the main actors within global governance, provide over different potentials of power. This aspect is going to be paid tribute with the new term. Hegemonic governance assumes, that in the international system we observe a unipolar constellation. The United States have – at least as far as hard power is regarded – overarching capabilities at their disposal. Also in the sphere of soft power the United States are a strong actor (not regarding the differences about the Iraq war which lead to a significant but temporary decline in soft power due to the unilateral application of force). They establish norms of behaviour, inspire international politics, and within most of the international institutions have a dominant voice. Hegemonic governance thus is to describe that we cannot negate this superior position of one actor within Global Governance. The US can apply hard and soft power – and they do so – to create behaviour in their own interest. The decision for hard or soft power most often depends on the relations with the concerned other states, its compliance and the possible threat posed by it, as well as traditional relations (alliances for example) and its influence and power. So for example Pakistan in the year 2006 was threatened with interventions of military kind even if there were good relations within the GWOT in existence. The threat of interventions – thus application of hard power – was meant to further improve Pakistan’s cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Generally hard power – as in this case – is only used as the exception. Soft power application is the rule. This oftentimes means that one can trust on the cooperation of states just because these are interdependent enough with the US or accept their authority. If this is not the case – as in Pakistan or in some European states at the time of the Iraq war – the responses differ. For example the European states (Germany, France) were not threatened with sanctions in case of noncooperation. Yet it is uncertain what would have been the results if there had been further negation of cooperation over a longer time period than observed. One still can assume that even within hegemonic governance control is not applied equally against
all states. There might even be states that are not controlled at all, be it by hard or soft power (North Korea), even if a true hegemon must abhor this situation.

The argumentation thus runs that within Global Governance we have to deal with a hegemonic constellation. This hegemony is based on unipolarity. Within global processes we don’t find an egalitarian multipolarity but partly unilateral unipolarity. The United States are the superior power also within Global Governance and they pursue their interests by the application of hard as well as soft power. Yet, within the economic sphere the term of unipolarity is more debatable than in the military sphere.

So the question should be posed:

*Why is there participation in hegemonic governance?*

It is argued here, that participation in Global Governance is particularly dependent on the mere structure of Global Governance. That is to say, in hegemonic governance, the mere hegemony of the undertaking is one cause of participation.

This research is furthermore set out to particularly look at participation in the Global Governance of Counterterrorism or to frame it differently: Why do actors participate in the Global War on Terrorism? This specific policy field was chosen due to the familiarity of the author with it stemming from previous publications.

As a case study, the case of global Counterterrorism was chosen. It is clearly a case wherein “States, international organizations … participate at different levels and in different constellations in the complex process of creation and implementation of international rules with global claim of validity” (Rittberger 2003:245). It is also a case for hegemonic governance, as the Global War on Terrorism (a term which can be used to describe the global efforts to counter terrorism under the auspices of the United States) is marked by strong US-American dominance. The United States are the clear leader in the global efforts to counter terrorism and therefore their Global War on Terrorism is more or less equal with global Counterterrorism and more or less equal with hegemonic governance. Other actors that participate in global Counterterrorism are the UN and the G8, they are – however – under the strong leadership and influence of the United States as well as other participating actors, such as the EU and ASEAN, as is going to be shown in this study.

Second, the actors looked at are regions. Regions are generally not an established actor in Global Governance, at least regarding the academic literature about the phenomenon. Within the concepts of Global Governance – from Rosenau and the Commission on Global Governance to Kahler, Neyer and Zürn for example – regions are only marginally theorized as
actors. Yet I argue that they visibly participate and thus are actors and worth studying. Participation in itself might be seen as one feature among others (like legitimacy, authority) for defining and entity as an actor. Regions here are understood as macro-regions, meaning entities that comprise a number of states. As the selected regions do participate in Counterterrorism, it is possible to establish these regions as the relevant actors for research on causes of participation.

As forms of participation (dependent variable) count compliance with United Nations regulations, active participation in multilateral programmes, promotion of counterterrorism, and congruent rhetoric.

As possible causes (independent variable) are regarded: absolute power, experience with integration and thus socialization, the calculation of threat and perception of terrorism (cost-benefit), relative power, interdependence with other actors and perception of dependency from other actors, complementarities of the elites, external pressure and authority of central institutions and actors (UN and US). The test variables established were active and passive coercion as well as making use of authority and legitimacy. These variables, if shown as causal for counterterrorism participation, would indicate hegemonic governance in this case. The control variables of socialization, threat of terrorism, elite complementarity and so forth would indicate integration as a main reason for counterterrorism participation.

**Causes for Participation: Force, Coercion and Influence in hegemony**

I will here argue, that the mere hegemony to be found in Global Governance of Counterterrorism is one cause for participation in the Global War on Terrorism (as the brand of Counterterrorism Governance that was given to it by the United States). Hegemonic governance will be further elaborated on in the following chapters. Here I will conclude on the factors causal for participation in it as well as control variables in the following.

Gramsci describes hegemony as “a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organisation of consent.” (Simon 1991: 22). Within this later use of hegemony he introduced the idea of oppression or coercion, hegemony being based on “a combination of force and consent” (ibd.).

The starting-point for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is that a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate classes by means of combination of coercion and persuasion. In his notes on Machiavelli’s Prince, Gramsci evokes the mystical Greek centaur, half animal and half human, as a symbol of the ‘dual perspective’ in political action – the levels of force
and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization. Hegemony is a relation, not of domination by means of force, but consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organization of consent. In some passages in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci uses the word *direzione* (leadership, direction), interchangeably with *egemonia* (hegemony) and in contrast to *dominazione* (domination). (The use of the term hegemony in the Gramscian sense must be distinguished from the original Greek meaning, the predominance of one nation over another. There are, however, a few passages in the Prison Notebooks where Gramsci uses hegemony in its ordinary sense of predominance to refer to relations between nations …)” (Simon 1982, 21).

I will therefore in the following understand hegemony as the exercise of power by a superior actor accompanied by participation, which is a result of consensus. What exactly now is hegemony based on? It can be understood as a combination of a set of structural features as well as actors characteristics and behavioural features. The structural feature refers to the position in the world system and according to the normal use in the literature is clearly based on unipolarity. Unipolarity implies domination (i.e. the command of great power, but not necessarily outright control by itself). But further unipolarity is enacted in certain ways. Power is exerted by means of soft power – such as ideology - or the application of ‘sticky’ and hard power and force. Whereas soft power use results in influence and thus the capacity to ‘affect policies and behaviours of other states’, sticky and hard power result in control meaning force and coercion or the ‘ability to achieve goals even in the face of opposition’. I do refer to Wartenberg (1990) in order to explain my use of the term power. Wartenberg distinguishes between force, coercion, and influence to describe forms of power and understands domination as the continuous exert of power over another actor.

*Force or ‘Control’*

“An exercise of power by an agent *A* over an agent *B* is an exercise of force if and only if *A* physically keeps *B* from pursuing the action-alternative that *B* wishes to pursue or causes a certain behaviour to apply to *B* that *B* would avoid if possible. Force achieves its ends by keeping an agent from doing what she wishes. An exercise of force relies on the physical ability of an agent to keep another agent from doing what she would prefer to do or to get something to happen to the agent that she would prefer did not” (Wartenberg 1990:93).

Force thus equals the application of hard power. It can be found in international relations in the form of interstate war (intrastate wars by definition are not a form of international force, even if international involvement is possible and international effects are frequent) or
intervention (one state wages war against another without the other states responding in kind), or international terrorism.

Coercion

“Coercive power … targets the set of action-alternatives that constitutes one aspect of an agent's action environment. When an agent is in a position to threaten to use a resource or ability [and by these means affects] the action-alternatives of another agent, then the agent can exercise coercive power” (Wartenberg 1990:96).

Coercive power is exercised if inequality in power resources can be used to threaten another actor and if this threat results in adaptation or behavioural change in the threatened actor. We thus only speak of coercion when compliance from side of the affected actor can be observed. Keohane and and Nye describe coercion (interestingly they do not speak of force in their discussion of power) as a form of behavioural power, hard power. Hard power can be exerted by the use of military or economic means and it is understood as the “ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threat of punishment or promise of reward” (Keohane and Nye 2001:220).

Influence

“In general, the distinctive feature of influence is that it occurs through the acceptance by the subordinate agent of something that the dominant agent tells her. In moving from force through coercive power to influence, one moves from a non-discursive form to a purely discursive one. Influence is a pure form of communicative interaction, one in which no non-discursive action is involved” (Wartenberg 1990:104f).

Influence results in compliance while it is matched by acceptation or consent from sides of the affected actor. Power here thus is used in a 'legitimate' way. It has the approval of the affected actor. If this approval is based on misperception or is well-informed does not matter for the concept of influence (even if it seems clear which form of power is the ethically superior form). Influence in IR terms can be described as 'soft power'. The term was coined by Joseph Nye to describe power resting on “attraction rather than coercion. … because the others want what you want” (Keohane and Nye 2001:220).

All these three forms of power are exerted by the United States to different degrees:
Force is mainly exerted outside or alongside ‘orthodox’ Global Governance, but is a form of
global governance in itself as it essentially transforms and orders the world in cooperation
with other actors (i.e. the Iraq war), coercion and influence are also to be found within Global
Governance. Whereas there has been much written on coercion in economic terms, there is
not so much literature on influence.

Force is not a typical feature of hegemony, as otherwise it would be understood as
‘dictatorship’ according to Gramsci or Empire as discussed elsewhere. However, coercion and
influence are typical features of hegemony and therefore shall be used as factors causal for
participation here. How can coercion and influence be conceptualized and operationalized for
this purpose?

Coercion is based on sanctions, the threat or the mere POSSIBILITY of sanctions that
induce a shift in the cost-benefit calculations of the exposed actors. Coercion can be active
and can then be understood as pressure, which is the threatening of negative sanctions or the
granting of positive sanctions towards other actors. Coercion can also be passive and can also
be understood as making use of asymmetric interdependence. Asymmetric interdependence
entails sensitivity and vulnerability and it entails the possibility of a superior and less
dependent actor to induce costs towards the more dependent actor. This mere POSSIBILITY
can be understood as coercion. If an actor calculates that it is better for him to follow the ways
of the stronger actor because he depends on him and a deterioration of the relationship might
entail unbearable costs for him, he is COERCED to adapt his behaviour EVEN IF the more
powerful actor does NOT THREATEN the use of this possibility. Therefore I do take here the
possibility of sanction as well as the possibility to induce costs as coercion.

Influence is based on authority and legitimacy that can be employed to change the
rationale and action of the exposed actors.

Therefore, herein, force is measured as the application of direct physical violence,
coercion is measured as pressure or making use of dependence via positive or negative
sanctions, influence is measured as making use of legitimacy and authority.

**Causes for Participation in ASEAN**

ASEAN mainly participates as a promoter of Counterterrorism towards its own member
states. There is therefore a relative lack of participation, even if it is clearly taking place. The
causes of participation will be looked at in the following, starting with the control variable of
threat of terrorism and then looking at the test variables.
a) Terrorist threat and perception of the threat

A more prominent threat and a more intensive perception of the threat imply the probability for participation increases due to possible gain (decrease of threat and increase in objective and subjective security).

Ramakrishna states, that terrorism is not a new threat within ASEAN. For example during the Cold War many countries within ASEAN especially Malaysia and Singapore had to combat Communists led terrorism. This was a Southeast Asia wide phenomenon. Within the Indochina conflict the Communists sought power through guerilla warfare and terrorism, so it is not a new phenomenon. And then he comes to elaborating on the threat perception:

“Especially since the End of the Cold War and the rise of religiously motivated terrorism ASEAN takes the threat very seriously, because any successful attack in the region tends to cause a great deal of political concern, especially over the prospect of FDI. This is very important to the region. So ASEAN governments are very confident to fight terrorism” (Ramakrishna).

Terrorism currently is a prominent problem for the states of ASEAN, as was shown before.

“We have identified 47 terrorist and extremist groups. If you look at the national security threats, there are four principle threats. One is terrorism, second is crime, and third is proliferation, and fourth there are another range of security issues like smuggling and piracy and all that. But in terms of classification, terrorism is the most serious security threat. It is the tier one security threat. But still the probability of an attack is very low. But if an attack occurs, it will have grave consequences for the stabilities. Thus we have to prevent terrorism.” (Gunaratna).

Some governments have taken the threat very seriously, the Singaporean government and the Malaysian government for example have employed their resources to the fight against terrorism. Some countries and some leaders have taken the threat very seriously. Other leaders have not done that. They have been looking at their own political situations.

Nathan describes that in terms of importance terrorism has to be qualified. Singapore has a number one connection to the US, and then come the Philippines, then Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The others just go along with what is done. Vietnam has no terrorist threat, Cambodia neither, but they go along with any ASEAN declaration. Still, in Indonesia and Malaysia it is not agreed that terrorism is a threat, because the majority is Muslim. So these states do not agree with everything the US is doing, they “don’t buy how the US define
terrorism and what is done” (Nathan).

Terrorism is not a problem that all states face to the same extent. „Even organizations such as Jemaah Islamyiah for instance are very small in terms of their numbers, capabilities and so forth. So it is a significant problem. But I would not argue that it is a critical one. It is a problem which is particularly significant for some countries” (Emmers). Terrorism is especially an urgent problem for three states: the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand (Emmers). Within Southern Thailand we find that we have to deal with a traditional conflict that are not there only since 911. Also in the Southern Philippines we can observe a conflict that is no less than 500 years of age. But there is a component of terrorism within these conflicts that makes them more problematic recently. The developments within Indonesia are of more recent date and they stem mainly from the Suharto period. These three states – so Emmers – are particularly facing the threat of terrorism. For this reason, they take the threat very seriously. Still, Southeast Asia is not seeing itself as the „second front“ within the war on terror, as has been the predominant perspective of the United States on Southeast Asia directly after September 11. But actually this is not the perspective that is taken within ASEAN.

„I think that ASEAN leaders see it as an immediate problem, short term. But I think they have articulated a number of occasions really that in the longer term they have bigger concerns: integration, rise of China, Sino-Japanese relations, American engagement etc. In the short term I think it is a security problem” (Liow).

Since the attacks in Bali the attention for terrorism has been on the decrease. Beyond that, terrorism is more seen as a short term, not a long term threat. Of course, there was still terrorism, especially in the Philippines. „But I think the regional states have adjusted to these new security realities over the past three, four years. So while they still see it as an immediate problem it is not such a major one as it was in October 2002” (Liow).

Singh confirms this perception:

“It [the threat] exists mostly in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, and Thailand, even if Thailand has a different threat. Even within these four countries the priority given to the threat varies. Although serious in the Philippines and Indonesia, Indonesia does not regard it as number one security threat. There challenges are really political stability and such. To Singapore, terrorism is very high on the agenda, even though they did not have a terrorist attack. They take it very seriously, more than any other country, even if the threat is more in other parts like Indonesia and Philippines” (Singh)
ASEAN overall – according to Gunaratna - has been taking the threat very seriously, Ong Keng Yong (Secretary General) has done whatever the nation states have permitted him to do. “You must understand that ASEAN is like the UN. The UN is only capable to act if the member states want it to act. That is the same with ASEAN. ASEAN is as good as what its members want it to do.” (Gunaratna)

“Asean views terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security and a direct challenge to the attainment of its own goal of peace, progress and prosperity. ASEAN commits itself to rooting out terrorism from the region” (Tatik).

To conclude, terrorism is still underestimated within the ASEAN states: „Terrorism is not a big issue for most SEA countries“ (Emmers). For this reason, especially the concerned states resort to bilateral and trilateral cooperation, as they cannot count on the cooperation of the wider community. At this level, thus, there has been more cooperation than within ASEAN itself: „This is where the most interesting forms of cooperation have been taking place. Not at the multilateral level including all the Southeast Asian countries, but increasingly at the bilateral and trilateral level” (Emmers).

b) Pressure or active coercion

External pressure for example is exerted by the threat of sanctions. Pressure thus is a cost factor. If pressure is exerted, this should lead to participation.

“ASEAN commits itself to rooting our terrorism from the region because it poses grave threat to its security, progress and prosperity. There is no external pressure on this” (Tatik).

Singh states that some countries do not need any pressure. Malaysia did not need pressure, Singapore does not need it. But: “I am sure there was pressure on president Megawati, especially when Indonesia was in a state of denial” (Singh).

Emmers states, that the United States are pursuing mainly a bilateral approach to cooperation with the states of ASEAN. This is rational, as the main field for cooperation is intelligence sharing, which can best be done by the single states. For this reason, one cannot really speak of pressure on ASEAN itself. But the US has again and again at the meetings of ASEAN stated that the GWOT is very important and cooperation in the interest of the US. On the other hand, cooperation was not always mutual: „And this of course often also leads to frustration in SEA because there is not always that much information being given to the SEA
countries.” (Emmers). At the bilateral level there is often some kind of ‘soft pressure’ exerted: training and funding is offered and some information shared. Especially the relations between the US and Indonesia had improved due to this.

Liow comes to the conclusion that pressure was definitely exerted, also at ASEAN itself. It was exerted especially through the Senior Officials Meetings, but also bilaterally. Within ASEAN the reaction has been uneven. There was no real willingness to be the „second front“ in the war on terror, but the attention that was given from sides of the US was welcome.

Conflict there has been with Indonesia and Malaysia. These were irritated – and felt possibly threatened – by the “with us or against us” rhetoric. Still these were needed to make the GWOT not seem a war on Islam.

Nathan states, that of course there is pressure, even if only informally. Apart from that, the United States due to their prominent role in the region do not really have to exert pressure. States will go along with their policies anyway:

“Of course the US will not give anything for free. There is no free lunch as they say. So if you want access to their markets, you will buy their support. Many of these countries have higher level of prosperity because their relations with the US. Its quite important. … [Pressure is] not directly exerted, it shows itself more in confidential discussions. But it is quite clear that many of the countries here go along, because the US can exert another kind of pressure on them: economic pressure, diplomatic pressure, even military pressure. Not that people here hate the US … but they learn to go along with it” (Nathan).

Ramakrishna introduces yet another perspective, in stating that the US does not really need to put pressure on ASEAN governments to do more on Counterterrorism. ASEAN governments see that it is in their interest to appear firm. Otherwise, there would be strong economic repercussions (Ramakrishna).

c) Making use of asymmetric interdependence or passive coercion

An increased asymmetric interdependence and perception of the same should lead to more participation.

For Emmers it is clear whom the ASEAN states depend on: „It is essentially the big powers“ (Emmers). The most important powers for ASEAN are the United States and China. Yet it has to be mentioned that the single states do not always have the same position as the overall...
position of ASEAN. This could not be generally established. The relation between Singapore and the United States for example are fundamentally different from those between Cambodia and the United States. Within the literature, this distinction often is not made.

One thus pays attention to other actors, especially the US and China. The rise of China is a cause for concern and a cause to wish for ongoing presence of the United States within the region as a security guarantee. Also Japan is an important power within the region, especially because it is the most important economic power after the US for the region. China is still backwards in this sense. And the big unknown is still how India is to develop. One has been talking about the rise of India for the last 15 years and now finally it can be observed. „But how the rise of India is actually going to have an impact on SEA security relations is still very unclear, is still undefined.” (Emmers). These are the states that ASEAN had to pay attention to and this could be observed within the activities of the ARF and other institutions.

Singh comes to the conclusion, that in economic terms, the US is not the only actor in the region anymore. There are others. But in the security dimension, it still is an important factor. ASEAN countries are quite small, they are not powerful, and they are very much dependent on outside trade, investments and so on. But they are not just dependent on one party, like the US for example. In their foreign policy decisions they have to bear in mind other actors too, like China, a little bit also Japan. Japan is a big investor in SEA. In the future there will be India, and the Europeans are important for investments, markets. And it differs from country to country. But generally, this is multifactorial. For example, to Laos and the Vietnamese, China features very prominently, but for example Indonesia features US much more important than China. They need investments, their good will, cooperation in international bodies like IMF and so forth. The US is a security guarantor in a general sense, for maintaining the balance of power in the region with regards to China. But security guarantees to particular countries are only in existence in Thailand and the Philippines.

Nathan also describes that the dependence from the US is declining because other actors are entering the picture: “ASEAN is now also getting more leverage because of the rise of other actors … for example China, India. The US in the economic dimension is no longer the supermom. The US is not in the position to control [economically]” Nathan.

According to Liow, one has to distinguish between spheres here. Of course globalization had increased the relations and thus the dependencies from other actors. ASEAN is trying to bring itself in in order to remain relevant. This is the strategy of ASEAN. It is the aim to engage partners in order to secure its own voice and relevance. One has to consider, that ASEAN does not have a foreign policy as such, but is trying to speak with one voice.
Hock states, that generally the interdependence with far distant states is less strong. Exceptions of course are the United States, the region being dependent on their military presence for the security of all.

d) Making use of authority and legitimacy by the central institutions of governance and central actors
Also authority of the central actors and institutions is leading to more participation.
Emmers is stating that we have to make the distinction between public opinion and the decision makers. “Mahatir for instance was always very critical of the US primarily because this is what public opinion wanted to hear. But at the same time Malaysia had extreme close military ties with the US and Malaysia wanted the US to be part of the region.” (Emmers). But the legitimacy question was “a huge one” and it was true that the US had lost a big part of their legitimacy within the Muslim states of Southeast Asia as a result of the war against Iraq and less Afghanistan. „The war in Iraq in particular has cost a lot of political good will in SEA” (Emmers). Still the political approach was to see the US as a security guarantee for the region. Interventions are not always welcome, but one would not easily give up the presence of the US in the region. “I think those capitals would be vary of seeing the US disengaging from the region.” (Emmers). The backlash against the Iraq war was comparable to that in Europe, but is now less at the forefront: “but there was a big backlash and there was a lot of anti-Americanism that sentiment was on the rise in SEA but I would not argue however that this has been automatically translated into a shift of thinking in some of the ASEAN countries” (Emmers). Emmers also believes that the Bush administration has become more considerate within its second term how to proceed their war on terrorism. The effects could be felt in ASEAN. “So I think relations and this very strong sense of Anti-Americanism might not be on the decline but might be stabilizing at least” (Emmers).

Ramakrishna takes a historical perspective: “There has been a generational change perhaps in the past. In the decolonization phase they were more suspicious about the colonial masters. This was in the 1950ies and early 1960ies. But since then you have a generational change. I don’t think these kinds of considerations are in effect now” (Ramakrishna).

Liow states that one could not speak of a common ASEAN position. In Indonesia and Malaysia there are important reservations against the war on terrorism. For example immigration of Muslims was an issue. Yet the war against Afghanistan was accepted. The war against Iraq was seen as unlawful. The Philippines and Singapore had bandwagoned with the
United States. Thailand had participated first with troops in Iraq, but then withdrew due to internal pressure and criticism. This is a broad spectrum and reflects the differences in legitimacy of the major actors. The EU and UN were not mentioned at all in this question and are probably not seen as major or important actors in counterterrorism.

Nathan also states, that one has to make the distinction between elites and populations here. The elites still want the US to be present in the region and have very good security relations to it. When it comes to managing the nation they can see common interests with the US. It has tremendous resources, it can provide with training, and economic relations. Also there is a commonality of interests. Still there is a lack of congruence of the view on the role of US here. “I think the Islamic factor also gets in with Indonesia and Malaysia, they don’t agree with the Global War on Terror, with Iraq, and with the situation in Israel to 100 percent” (Nathan). Yet, even military presence within the region from sides of the US is not seen as a threat. “I don’t think anyone is asking the US to get out. Everybody recognizes the importance of the US. Even Vietnam does not [ask to get out]. As Chinas importance grows, US might be seen in a more positive light as a balancer, as the EU too” (Nathan).

Singh thinks, as far as the US is concerned, it has lost some of its soft power because of the policies of this Bush administration. But the governments will still regard the US as legitimate. The Singapore government for example may say: “Bush may be an idiot. But still, we want you around” (Singh). The UN features less prominent. There is a good image of the UN, everybody thinks well of the UN. It is not seen as very effective, but there is support.

The UN is generally seen as a legitimate actor, also according to Nathan: “The UN is seen as a legitimate big player. You still need the UN as a legitimate interlocutor, mediator, where nation states cannot play that role, even if it is failing in certain areas. We would like the UN to be more effective” (Nathan).

**Causes of Participation in the EU**

The European Union does participate very broadly in the Global War on Terrorism. In the following, the results for the control and test variables will be presented.

a) Terrorist threat and perception of the threat

Keohane states, that the threat of terrorism in Europe is an important motivator for Counterterrorism (Keohane). However, of course, this threat differs between states with respect to their history of terrorism. So, for example, Spain and Great Britain have a large interest in countering terrorism whereas other states are more negligent. However, on the
European level, terrorism is just on priority among others. It is an important priority, but other security interests come before countering terrorism (Keohane). Kahl also states that terrorism is seen as an important problem. But he again states that it depends on different actors in different nations. However, terrorism in the EU is understood more as a crime than a military problem and therefore the responses to terrorism differ from that of the United States. For example the attacks in London and Madrid are new phenomenae which pose a problem to intelligence and police forces, but not the military. Further attacks are expected, however not a large attack as in the United States, but smaller attacks like the past. The EU is preparing for these smaller but more likely attack. The EU generally according to Kahl seems not to be threatened by attacks coming from foreign countries but by internal attacks. Maybe here is a reason for less participation in military pursuits and the larger focus on police work. Bauer states that terrorism is an important issue for the political agenda in Europe (Bauer). However, the EU here differs to the EU and is less understood as a military threat but a criminal danger. It is also not as high on top of the agenda in the EU as it is in the United States. However, he states that the threat of terrorism is higher in the EU than the United States due to their large immigrant communities, problems with integration and the general closeness of the societies to potential terrorist. Also, there are more freedoms for possible terrorist which leads to a higher threat.

The perception of the threat is perceived different in EU member states, so Lindstrom. Threat perception is higher in countries like Spain, UK and so forth. In other countries, the threat perception is lower, like in Sweden, Finland. So it is difficult to speak of a general sense of terrorism seen as a threat shared by all member states and to the same extent, so Lindstrom. However, if you look at some on the public opinion data that comes out concerning the main threat Europeans face, terrorism is high on the list. And in the EU security strategy terrorism is one of the five key threats that the EU faces. To some extent there is a common threat perception, therefore.

Signore contends that terrorism is a top priority of the EU. The Vice President of the Commission had described the risk of terrorism as very high, of course higher in some member states than in others. But it is substantial in all over the EU. It is therefore a top priority without any doubt. It is one of the very few top priorities of the Commission, together with climate change, energy security, and migration. It is also for the Council high on the agenda.
b) Pressure or active coercion

According to Keohane, the United States definitely wants to work with the Europeans to counter terrorism. However, he stated, there is no open pressure to be found in the dealings of the Americans with the European Union. However, he also stated that there was open pressure in the dealings with national governments, such as France, Italy, Spain and Great Britain. So, pressure is more likely to be exerted bilaterally. Still, there was likely to be more pressure from sides of the Europeans towards North African countries, for example. And, according to Keohane, Counterterrorism coordinator de Vries had stated that many foreign countries directly address him to find ways to cooperate in counterterrorism. Kahl states that the example of the sharing of passenger data shows that the United States definitely exerts pressure on the EU to cooperate. Informal pressure is high, he states, and is exerted over diplomatic channels. This was observed particularly with regards to participation in the Iraq war (Kahl). Bauer states that pressure is not exerted officially. According to Kuhne there is no pressure from sides of the United States in particular to cooperate. The EU participates in global Counterterrorism out of its own rationality and interest. There might have been exceptions to this general rule, however.

Lindstrom contends that there is definite pressure of the United States. Examples were pressure has been exerted are the PNR (Personal Name Records), as well as the visa regimes, and many others. There is very strong pressure from the US side particularly regarding the visa issue. The US is pushing the EU to take certain measures. And this is having an effect, as the Europeans are trying to address those requests. However, the United Nations does not exert any pressure whatsoever.

Singore states that there was no one who was pushing the EU to cooperate. There was no need for anyone to push the EU, as the fight against terrorism was a top priority of the EU. The EU did not make the fight against terrorism a top priority because of external pressure.

c) Making use of interdependence or passive coercion

This was regarded as an interesting factor by Keohane. However, he stated that economic interdependence is likely to be not a factor for participation. Interdependence could be found nonetheless: in the EU’s entanglement with American intelligence services for example. Kahl states that interdependence has never been mentioned in his experience as a cause for cooperation by EU officials. Economic consequences have been threatened by the United States in the beginning of the Iraq war but were without consequences. Bauer states that interdependence plays sometimes a role. This was to be observed in the case of sharing of
passenger data. Here it was feared that in case of non-cooperation there were costs to be feared.

Lindstrom states that interdependence only has effect to a certain extent, depending on the measures to be implemented. Interdependence with the United States he understands a being not as important as other factors, the calculation is not economic but based on self-interest. The EU sees itself as a possible target and therefore has to cooperate. Interdependence therefore only could be understood only as a common exposure to threat.

Singore states that he had not personally heard of this kind of threats or issues. He sais, he does not know exactly this is the case. In a lot of bilateral negotiations for trade relations the EU is trying to put clauses concerning counterterrorism by itself to induce others to cooperate. It is clear for Signore that the EU is trying to get the cooperation of the different areas of the world. These areas are more and more convinced to cooperate, there is more political will. But cooperation is not due to interdependence. Europe faces a threat that is perhaps higher than that of the United States because of a number of reasons, such as Islamic residents, closeness to the Middle East and so forth. The EU is a primary actor and with what it is doing at the international level, and in the UN, it is always at the forefront.

d) Making use of authority and legitimacy of the central institutions of governance and central actors

Generally the United States in particular, but especially the United Nations are seen as legitimate actors, according to Keohane. With regards to the United States it “depends on which government you ask” (Keohane). Generally, the Europeans are not very much in favour of the Global War on Terrorism and think that the Iraq war has not helped the cause to tackle terrorism. It is even thought that the US foreign policy has increased the threat. The EU is not supportive of all aspects of United States foreign policy. Particularly it criticizes that the Global War on Terrorism “lumps together all Islamist groups” under the category of “terrorists”. There is an ongoing transatlantic conversation about this. But generally the US is understood to be the real target of “new terrorism” and therefore it is legitimate as a leader in global Counterterrorism efforts. The EU and the US agree on the severity of the threat. Kahl states that the United States has lost authority due to the Iraq war and the missing legitimation thereof (Kahl). He mentions particularly the question of weapons of mass destruction and the lack thereof in this case. Bauer states that authority of the central actors plays a role in participation, but this factor is limited, as can be seen in the case of Iraq where opposition was openly stated with regards to the interventions. On the other hand, in the strategies of the EU
it is directly referred to the United Nations, which has a higher legitimacy therefore as the United States. According to Kuhne the US and the UN are seen as legitimate actors in global Counterterrorism. The UN in particular is the reference point with regards to legitimacy, and cooperation with it serves to raise the legitimacy of the EU. The US also is seen as a legitimate actor, however, there are practical and political differences. Still, the legitimacy is undoubted.

Lindstrom says that the US will take certain measures against terrorism. There are great concerns about some freedoms, about some measures. Those people feel that some legitimacy has left. Others feel that these measures are necessary. On the other hand, even the US will react to external pressure. For example, there is not much any more speak about the “War on Terror”, for example. So there are efforts to accommodate European concerns. However, this factor depends on the regarding governments. Some see the US as an authority and legitimacy, others would object this view. The United Nations are seen as legitimate but not as very powerful.

Singore contends that there are different approaches between the US and the EU in countering terrorism. That being said, the fight against terrorism is now an international priority in which the US is a frontrunner, but does not have leadership. Everybody faces the risk, the Middle East, Russia, the EU and others. There is not the need for a specific leadership in this struggle. However, there is a specific role for the United Nations to coordinate the efforts of the different regions and countries.

**Conclusion**

This work tried to single out hegemonic governance as a root cause of participation in the Global War on Terror or the Global Governance of Counterterrorism. It was argued, that the structure of Global Governance, which is a hegemonic one in Counterterrorism, leads to participation.

**ASEAN**

It was found in the case studies, that this holds true for ASEAN, which comprised the first case study. ASEAN obviously is under the influence of the United States and its participation in the global efforts to counter terrorism are in part motivated by the US hegemony and ASEAN’s dependence on it. As the ASEAN nations are heavily dependent on the cooperation of the United States as well as foreign direct investment and protection, they are more willing to cooperate than they would otherwise be. Of course, also the threat of terrorism itself is a
motivation to counter terrorism. However, it is not the only motivating factor.

Evaluation of the factors

The results for ASEAN show, that terrorism threat and its perception is among the highest rated causes for counterterrorism. ASEAN thus is a rational actor that tries to minimize its threats to security and peace, as the ASEAN Secretariat also states. In addition, as shown before, terrorism is a real threat to the region.

This argument is supported by Singh, who states:

“I think the internal factors are more important. In the countries where the terrorism threat is more serious … we want to deal with the threat for our own reasons. We have very powerful reasons. We don’t want to have our people killed, like in Bali. Also, it has huge economic repercussions, for example on tourism. … the most powerful reasons are our own. If we did not have these reasons and there were only international reasons, then we probably would not do much” (Singh).

However, pressure and authority directly follow this factor as important factors. So Nathan states:

“It is a combination of both [internal and external factors]. I think it [ASEAN] wants to fight terrorism for its own reasons: state survival. … These governments have a stake in the international system in which the US is a big player. So they do fight with the international system. You fight to protect your own assets, you cooperate with the big powers, and there is a strategic consensus.”

So, here the argument is made that there are external systemic factors, which are responsible for counterterrorism. According to an analysis of the interviews, these factors might be pressure, less so interdependence with the main actor in counterterrorism (US), but also its legitimacy and authority. Therefore, we find here indications of coercion and influence. This is congruent with the finding that terrorism as a threat is only experienced by number of states within ASEAN to varying degrees. Not all states share the threat and feel compelled due to this reason to the fight against terrorism. This is not to say, though, that there might not be genuine security considerations that also contribute to the fight against terrorism.

There is, however, only informal pressure from sides of the United States to go along with their policies (an exception here is Myanmar). Yet, if there was noncooperation, the
position of ASEAN was compromised and it would probably experience the consequences from sides of the international community, particularly the United States. For all states, the prominent role of the United States was stated, as well as dependency on the United States due to various issues (such as security and economics). The United States serves as a security guarantor as well as provides with open markets, technology and so forth. This factor probably plays as strong a role as terrorism itself as a threat. Proof for this can also be seen in the fact, that for example Singapore has been very cooperative in the War on Terror, having very good relations to the US but only a minor threat of terrorism. As well, cooperation in Indonesia is critical, even if it has a major threat, but its relations to the US are still mediocre. Ramakrishna offers this explanation:

“ASEAN governments recognize that if they are seen not to be taking a firm stand against terrorism, there will be a negative political impact, both domestically as in term of foreign direct investment, and this is very important to ASEAN, especially because it sees itself in competition with other Asian regions and states. So they have to show that they are serious in dealing with terrorism” (Ramakrishna).

This argument for asymmetric interdependence as a factor is supported when one reads the chairman’s statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur 2005 and where terrorism was referred to in the following way: “We are aware that the region is being confronted with challenges such as the threat of terrorism, the outbreak of avian influenza, and the rise in oil prices which have direct negative impact on regional economic development and public health.”

A contributing factor – but to lesser extent – is elite complementarity. A factor that definitely leads to cooperation and participation seemingly is socialization. Relative power is missing, but even more so internal power, which is probably the most important cause for the relative lack of participation as compared with the EU.

So, there is the issue of strength. ASEAN as such might not be the right instrument to fight terrorism. There are no terrorism bodies in ASEAN and institutionally it is generally pretty weak. It was often stated, that the real power remains with the nation states and there is no instrument of ASEAN to engage in the fight against terrorism. So this is surely the main factor for limits in the participation in the Global War on Terrorism from sides of ASEAN.

Overall, we find here clear indications for exertion of hegemony via active and (less so) passive coercion and making use of authority and legitimacy. Other factors that speak for
integration as a cause for participation (such as socialization) also seem to be causal.

<table>
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<th>Emmers</th>
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<th>Singh</th>
<th>Nathan</th>
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<th>Gunaratna</th>
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<td>Power external</td>
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The EU

However, it was also found, that hegemony of the US is more critical in case of the relationship with the EU. The EU seemingly is a very strong actor in the field of Counterterrorism, it is coerced to comply but it acts primarily independent from influence of the United States. It’s main motivation to fight terrorism, it was stated, is terrorism and the threat that it poses to the security of Europe. The European Union therefore is seemingly not under the hegemony of the United States - at least not in the field of Counterterrorism - and this should be researched further. What impacts does it have on international relations if the European Union is a very strong actor in its own right and particularly in a security field?

Evaluation of the factors

According to Keohane, the greatest cause of Counterterrorism cooperation are terrorist attacks. This became apparent after 9/11 and the following attacks in Europe. “Nothing is better than a disaster to get people do something” (Keohane). Kahl also states that internal factors are causal for participation in Global Governance. The main internal factor is the threat of terrorism. Terrorism cannot be tackled by unilateral measures alone, it is understood, and therefore there is cooperation and compliance with the central actors. However, the style and extent of participation depends on political culture and the own understanding of the nature of the threat (Kahl). However, Kahl states also, that all of the mentioned factors play a role in counterterrorism cooperation and compliance. However, it is the interests of the EU
that determine EU counterterrorism participation and not the interests of the United States as a central actor. Bauer states that it is especially internal factors that cause participation, particularly within Europe. The focus of Europe is on Europe. According to Kuhne it is the factor of a common threat that causes Counterterrorism cooperation and compliance. This threat is shared with the US in particular, but also other nations, and therefore can here be understood as an external factor (different to my categorization of terrorism threat as an internal factor). It provokes a community of defense between particularly the EU and US and leads to Counterterrorism participation.

Lindstrom contends that particularly the external factors are important for counterterrorism cooperation. Here he mentions particularly the threat – international terrorism – that produces cooperation in counterterrorism.

However, pressure from the central actors (particularly the US) was given as a causal factor by four interviewees. That means, pressure is exerted and the European Union does respond to this pressure. In the same line, the interviews clearly showed, that the authority and the legitimacy of the US and UN in the Global War on Terrorism are debatable within the EU, given the known criticism in the case of Iraq. Therefore, we can speak of indications for exertion of hegemony here, via active coercion (pressure) but less so by making use of authority and legitimacy, also with a clear lack of passive coercion (making use of interdependence). It must be discussed if this relations then still can count as a hegemonic one.

However, also factors that speak for integration as a cause for participation can be found, such as socialization and elite complementarity.

The overall factor analysis shows, that there are other factors of importance beyond terrorism as a threat. To start with, internal (absolute) power or the lack thereof is a slight impediment to counterterrorism participation, whereas relative power facilitates it. Socialization clearly facilitates cooperation and compliance. The European Union due to its history of integration has learned that multilateralism and cooperation can be beneficial and is therefore more likely to participate in multilateral efforts. In opposition to ASEAN, in the EU interdependence or its use are not of importance for counterterrorism participation. Three interviewees stated this. Elite complementarity is of importance for Counterterrorism cooperation.
In the overall analysis, we have found clear indicators that speak for hegemonic governance. The United States does exert pressure towards the European Union as well as ASEAN in order to create participation in the Global War on Terrorism. There are less indications of passive coercion via making use of interdependence, even if some interviewees from Southeast Asia clearly stated this as a factor. For Southeast Asia the factor of legitimacy and authority is important, however, less so for the European Union. Also, other factors are of importance, such as socialization, threat, and elite complementarity. This speaks for the result that both global and regional integration as well as hegemonic governance are among the causes for Counterterrorism participation.
Literature


Interviews:

Interviews with scholars in Singapore at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) as well as the ASEAN Secretariat:
Prof. Nathan (ISEAS)
Dr. Emmers (IDSS)
Dr. Liow (IDSS)
Dr. Singh (ISEAS)
Dr. Hock (ISEAS)
Dr. Gunaratna (IDSS)
Prof. Ramakrishna (IDSS)
Ms. Tatik (ASEAN Secretariat)

Interviews with European scholars:

Daniel Keohane (Centre for European Reform, London)
Dr. Martin Kahl (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Hamburg)
Michael Bauer (Centre for Applied Policy Research, Munich).
Gustav Lindstrom (EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris)
Stefano Singore (Private Office of Vice President Frattini, European Commission, Brussells)
Helmut Kuhne (Member of the European Parliament, Strasbourg)

NOTES

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1 I want to thank the anonymous reviewer for very valuable clarification at this point.

2 There is no need for US leadership, Singore stated.