IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND OBJECTIVES IN TURKEY

Ibrahim Al-Marashi*

It is important now to have a full understanding of the type, nature and breadth of the Iraqi regime’s security organizations given that if Turkey were to serve as a base for an US plan to overthrow Saddam’s regime, the Iraqi agencies’ activities in its neighbor to the north will most likely be activated. The purpose of the following paper is two-fold: 1) to examine the activities of these agencies in Turkey in the past 2) to examine the structure of these agencies and how they would respond to possible Turkish involvement in a US regime-change operation.

The five primary agencies that make up the Iraqi security apparatus are al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security), al-Amn al-’Amm (General Security), al-Mukhabarat (General Intelligence), al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya (Military Intelligence) and al-Amn al-’Askari (Military Security) al-Mukhabarat al-’Iraqiyya (The Iraqi Intelligence).

The jurisdictions of the agencies are designed to be duplicative, to maintain competition and to ensure that no one security service will emerge too strong as to threaten Saddam. The collective responsibilities of the agencies are to protect the President, maintain internal security by countering domestic dissention, including coups and mass insurrection, preventing external threats to the regime and conducting foreign operations. All of these agencies also play a role in the procurement and concealment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The
three agencies that are tasked with foreign operations in Turkey are *al-Amn al-Khas, al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya and al-Mukhabarat*. Analysis of the emergence, structure and activities of the agencies can discern how this network has and would operate inside of Turkey.

The following piece is augmented by information provided by the Iraq Research and Documentation Project, which houses over 4 million documents captured from Iraqi state security agencies.¹ Other sources of information come from the Iraqi National Congress, a coalition of opposition groups opposed to the current government in Iraq. Their networks have also provided valuable information on the Iraqi security apparatus’ activities in Turkey.

**THE EMERGENCE OF SADDAM’S SECURITY APPARATUS**

The number and size of these security agencies have grown dramatically since the Ba’th takeover in 1968. Prior to the Ba’thist coup in 1968, the two oldest intelligence agencies were General Security and Military Intelligence. General Security, the oldest security agency in the country, dates back to 1921, when it was created during the British Mandate era.² General Security monitors the day-to-day lives of the population creating a pervasive local presence in Iraqi society.³ Military Intelligence was created in 1932, during the time of Iraq’s independence.⁴ The primary functions of Military Intelligence are ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces and gathering military intelligence.

After the Ba’thist coup in 1968, then Vice-President Saddam began to exercise indirect control of Iraq’s politics. The vast network of Iraq’s security apparatus emerged after this date. The creation of various intelligence agencies was in direct response to events that instilled a sense of insecurity in Saddam. For example, in 1973, Saddam transformed *al-Jihaz al-Hanin*, a Ba’th party security unit into an official state intelligence agency, *Da’irat al-Mukhabarat* al-
'Amma (The General Intelligence Department) or al-Mukhabarat. This move was in response to the failed coup attempt by the former General Security director, Nadhim Kazzar.

Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security) was created during the Iran-Iraq War to serve as a super-secret organization and emerged as the most powerful agency in the security apparatus. There were two incidents that most likely encouraged the creation of Special Security. The first incident was the failure of Military Intelligence to predict and protect Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor against an Israeli air raid in 1981. Military Intelligence had been warned that the reactor was vulnerable, when the Iranians earlier tried to destroy the reactor in a failed air raid. Saddam was displeased with the failure of Military Intelligence to act upon the earlier attack and provide the necessary protective measures against the Israeli raid.

Al-Amn al-Khas emerged from within al-Amn al-’Amm in 1982 to provide bodyguards to the President after a failed assassination attempt on Saddam’s life. In this second instance, Saddam was disappointed with the failure of General Security and General Intelligence to preempt this attack. Husayn Kamil, who was Saddam’s cousin, and son-in-law, as well as Minister for Military Industrialization, was instrumental in the creation of this agency and only selected loyal and devoted agents from the al-Amn al-’Amm, al-Istikhbarat and al-Mukhabarat to serve in this ultra-elite intelligence unit. By creating this agency, Saddam was able to maintain greater control over the various units in the security network. Saddam also created al-Amn al-Khas to oversee the activities of Military Intelligence and to ensure they were taking the necessary measures to protect Iraq’s military facilities.

In 1992, Saddam established al-Amn al-’Askari (Military Security), which grew out of Special Bureau of the Istikhbarat. Saddam created this independent entity to report directly to the Presidential Palace rather than military command or the Ministry of Defense. This unit was
created after Saddam detected disturbances in the military. Thus, Military Intelligence, General Intelligence and Special Security, as well as the Special Republican Guard and the Emergency Forces were created in response to intelligence failures or to specific threatening events, whether they were coup or assassination attempts against Saddam. Reports of a separate intelligence ministry only confirm this trend.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL [AL-MAJLIS AL-AMN AL-QAWMI]

While not an agency in itself, al-Majlis al-Amn al-Qawmi (The Iraqi National Security Council) is an important element of Iraq’s security network. According to one source, Saddam Hussein established the Council in order to manage the activities of the other intelligence agencies. Headed by Saddam, but usually chaired by Qusay, the Council is represented by the Office of the Presidential Palace, and Iraq’s five major security units. While al-Amn al-Khas was created to serve as an agency to coordinate Iraq’s competing intelligence and security services, al-Majlis serves as an over-arching body on intelligence matters.

SPECIAL SECURITY [AL-AMN AL-KHAS]

Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security) was created during the Iran-Iraq War to serve as a super-secret organization and emerged as the most powerful agency in the security apparatus. The current director of al-Amn al-Khas is Saddam’s son, Qusay Hussein.

Al-Amn al-Khas’ objectives can be roughly classified as follows: 1) providing security for the President, at all times, especially during travel and public meetings; 2) securing all presidential facilities, such as palaces and offices; 3) supervising other security and intelligence services; 4) monitoring government ministries, and the leadership of the armed forces; 5) supervising internal security operations against the Kurdish and Shi’a opposition; 6) purchasing
foreign arms and technology; 7) securing Iraq’s most critical military industries; and 8) directing efforts to conceal Iraq’s WMD programs.

Opposed to the other four major security organizations, al-Amn al-Khas serves as the inner most intelligence agency of the regime, functioning as the nerve center of the Saddam’s security agencies. The members of this Bureau enjoy a higher standard of living than the elements of the other agencies.\textsuperscript{14} According to Iraqi defectors and exiles, this agency more than any other instills a sense of fear in all layers of Iraqi society.

While its primary duty is protecting the President, it manages the actions of the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard. Al-Amn al-Khas is charged with the surveillance of al-Mukhabarat, al-Istikhbarat, al-Amn al-’Askari, and al-Amn al-’Amm, essentially “spying on Iraqi spies.”

Al-Amn al-Khas watched over the activities of al-Istikhbarat and the KGB, during the Iran-Iraq War. The KGB provided advice to these agencies in techniques of concealing covert weapons production facilities.\textsuperscript{15} During the 1991 Gulf War it was put in charge of concealing SCUD missiles\textsuperscript{16} and afterwards in moving and hiding documents from UNSCOM inspections, relating to Iraq’s weapons programs. Based on these past activities, it would presumably continues these functions in the future.

\textbf{The Political Bureau}

The Political Bureau collects and analyses intelligence and prepares operations against “enemies of the state.” This unit keeps an extensive file on all Iraqi dissidents or subversives. Under the Political Bureau, The Operations Office implements operations against these “enemies,” including arrests, interrogations and executions. Another division is the Public Opinion Office, responsible for collecting and disseminating rumors on behalf of the state.\textsuperscript{17}
Along with *al-Mukhabarat*, *al-Amn al-Khas* agents infiltrated the Kurdish enclave in the north of Iraq in August of 1996, to hunt down operatives of the Iraqi opposition. *Al-Amn al-Khas* has been known to pursue their opponents across the border areas into Iran and Turkey, especially. The major focuses of these operations are against forces of the Kurdish Democratic Party that had been operating in the border areas near Turkey.

It serves as the central coordinating body between Military-Industrial Commission, *al-Istikhbarat* and *al-Mukhabarat*, and the military in the covert procurement of the necessary components for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Due to its role in acquiring arms or arms components from foreign suppliers, *al-Amn al-Khas* has most likely used Turkey or Jordan as a conduit for such operations.

It is also thought that *al-Amn al-Khas* is responsible for the illegal trade in violation of UN sanctions. Reports attribute this agency to conducting this trade through Turkey and Iran for example.

**GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE [AL-AMN AL-'AMM]**

*Al-Amn al-'Amm* (General Security), the oldest security agency in the country, dates back to 1921, when it was created during the British Mandate era. *Al-Amn al-'Amm* is essentially a political security police force. Its activities are: 1) detecting dissent among the Iraqi general public; 2) reacting to political criminal behavior; and 3) preventing economic criminal activity. The current head is Rafi Abd al-Latif Talfah.

*Al-Amn al-'Amm* monitors the day-to-day lives of the population creating a pervasive local presence. The headquarters of *al-Amn al-'Amm* is located in Baghdad, from which it guides the work of the *al-Amn* branches in each Iraqi governate. Saddam provided it with a paramilitary wing known as *Quwat al-Tawari* (or The Emergency Forces) after the 1991 Gulf War.
War to reinforce law and order. Al-Quwat al-Tawari’ units were responsible for hiding Iraqi ballistic missile components. Due to its domestic focus, Al-Amn al-Amm has not taken part in foreign operations.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE [AL-ISTIKHBARAT AL-’ASKARIYYA]

Mudiriyyat al-Istikhabarat al-‘Askariyya al-‘Amma (or The General Military Intelligence Directorate) was created in 1932, during the time of Iraq’s independence. Its responsibilities include: 1) tactical and strategic reconnaissance of regimes hostile to Iraq; 2) assessing threats of a military nature to Iraq; 3) monitoring the Iraqi military and ensuring the loyalty of the officer corps; 4) maintaining a network of informants in Iraq and abroad, including foreign personnel, and military human intelligence; and 5) protection of military and military-industrial facilities.

The primary functions of Military Intelligence are ensuring the loyalty of the military and gathering military intelligence, but it is also involved in foreign operations, including assassinations of opponents to the regime. Any of Saddam’s opponents based in Turkey could be vulnerable to an operation conducted by Military Intelligence, as they have conducted successful assassinations abroad in the past. Military Intelligence currently maintains a network of informants including operatives in Turkey, as well as closely monitors any Turkish military maneuvers in the Iraq-Turkey border area.

Divisions

Al-Istikhbarat is divided into a Special, Political and Administrative Bureau. The Special Bureau is primarily responsible for investigations and clandestine operations. The Special Bureau

The Special Bureau

The Special Bureau is responsible for carrying out military operations, and could be tasked with missions involving the assassination or monitoring of political opponents in Turkey.
Unit 999 is a "deep penetration" unit of this Bureau, responsible for domestic and international clandestine operations. The Unit 999 has five battalions of 300 men apiece, and an additional battalion to counter Iraqi opposition groups, including infiltration of opposition militias in the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. The first is the "Persian" Battalion and as the name suggests deals with Iranian threats. The second is the "Saudi Arabia" Battalion and the third is "Palestine" Battalion, dealing with Israeli threats. The fourth is known as the "Turkish" Battalion, which is designed to respond to any threats from Turkey. The other two battalions are responsible for sea-borne operations and the Iraqi opposition.

*The Political Bureau*

The Political Bureau focuses on the collection of intelligence and information. The Political Bureau collects intelligence from defense attachés in Iraqi diplomatic missions in Turkey. Intelligence is also collected through other agents, such as the extensive networks of informants in Turkey, who are equiped with sophisticated clandestine communications systems.

*Regional Bureaus*

*Al-Istikhbarat* maintains regional headquarters throughout the country, in administrative areas known as *manthumat*. *Al-Istikhbarat al-’Askariyya* is divided into four *manthumat* and their areas of jurisdiction for collecting intelligence include: 1) Kirkuk; 2) Mosul; 3) Basra; and 4) Baghdad. The Mosul *manthumah* collects military-related intelligence on Turkey.

*Operations Abroad*

Reportedly, *al-Istikhbarat* was responsible for the assassination operations of Saddam’s opponents in Beirut, Detroit, London, and Paris. Among the victims was ‘Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef, a former senior Ba’th official who was murdered in London in 1978. It also provided logistical support for the takeover of the Iranian Embassy in London in May 1980.
possibility of an assassination attempt against Iraqi dissidents or American officials in Turkey could likely be carried out by Istikhbarat.

THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE [AL-MUKHABARAT]

While al-Istikhbarat was created during the period of Iraq’s monarchy, al-Mukhabarat (The Iraqi Intelligence Service)\textsuperscript{35} emerged from within the Iraqi Arab Socialist Ba’th Party. It was formally incorporated into Iraq’s security structure in the early seventies.

Al-Mukhabarat is roughly divided into two departments, responsible for internal and international operations respectively. Its internal activities were coordinated through provincial offices while its international operations were conducted from various Iraqi embassies. Its internal activities include: 1) monitoring the Ba’th Party, as well as other political parties; 2) monitoring other grass roots organizations, including youth, women and union groups; 3) suppressing Shi’a, Kurdish and other opposition; 4) counter-espionage; 5) targeting threatening individuals and groups inside of Iraq; 6) monitoring foreign embassies in Iraq; 6) monitoring foreigners in Iraq; and 7) maintaining an internal network of informants. Thus this agency would be responsible for monitoring any Turks residing inside of Iraq, including diplomats and businessmen.

Its external activities include: 8) monitoring Iraqi embassies abroad; 9) collection of overseas intelligence; 10) aiding opposition groups to hostile regimes; 11) conducting sabotage, subversion, and terrorist operations against hostile neighboring countries such as Syria and Iran; 12) murder of opposition elements outside of Iraq; 13) infiltrating Iraqi opposition groups abroad; 14) providing disinformation and attempts to exploit or use Arab and other media; and 15) maintaining an international network of informants, using popular organizations as well such as the Union of Iraqi Students.\textsuperscript{36}
Thus its objectives vis-à-vis Turkey would include collecting intelligence on the Turkish opinions on a US strike against Iraq, providing logistical aid to the PKK, infiltrating the Iraqi Turcoman opposition parties based in Turkey, as well as maintaining a network of informants in Turkey, that would in fact rival the Al-Istikbarat network.

Political Bureau

The Political Bureau includes a number of Directorates, such as Directorate Four, The Secret Service Office. The activities of the Secret Service Directorate Four take place both in Iraq and abroad, with its agents infiltrated into Iraqi government departments, the Ba’th Party, in unions and organizations, Iraqi embassies and the Iraqi opposition abroad. This office would monitor the Iraqi diplomatic facilities in Turkey. The Directorate includes a number of offices specializing in the collection of information against a specific country, including Turkey.37

Directorate Nine works outside of Iraq in co-ordination with other directorates focusing on sabotage and assassination operations, and would be responsible for conducting assassination of any Iraqi dissidents in Turkey.38 A Planning Office collects and analyses Turkish media such as radio, satellite TV and newspapers.39

Regional Bureaus

Directorates 21 through 26 are responsible for monitoring various regional districts in Iraq. Directorate 24, the Northern District, is responsible for monitoring Turkish military operations against the PKK in northern Iraq. The directorate is based in Mosul, with an office in Kirkuk, and is responsible for infiltrating the Kurdish militias in the north of Iraq.40

Operations Abroad

Al-Mukhabarat’s activities after the Gulf War were prioritized to concentrate on internal security, however it began to shift it foreign operations soon afterwards. According to Lebanese
security forces, three agents of *al-Mukhabarat* were responsible for the assassination of Iraqi exile, Shaykh Talib al-Suhayl in 1994.\(^{41}\) Such assassination operations are conducted by Directorate Nine and Directorate 14 of *al-Mukhabarat*.\(^{42}\) Similar operations are focused in Amman, Jordan, which became a hub of Iraqi exiles and anti-Saddam opposition groups after 1991. Its main task is the infiltration of anti-regime organizations, such as the Iraqi National Accord, an opposition group based in Jordan. By infiltrating the INA in 1996, the regime was able to arrest and execute military officers connected to the organization.\(^{43}\) When relations improved between Saddam and the Mas’ud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party in 1996, *al-Mukhabarat* agents were able to infiltrate areas in Northern Iraq to eliminate agents of the CIA or Iraqi opposition.\(^{44}\)

It also undertook operations against Iraqi expatriates in Europe, the US, as well as in Australia and New Zealand.\(^{45}\) Reports say that *al-Mukhabarat* opened offices in a number of countries, such as Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Jordan.\(^{46}\) It is said to monitor the activities of Iraqi journalists abroad, with the purpose of inducing them to write sympathetic works for the Iraqi regime or silencing them if they refuse. Dissident Ba’th journalists, who are either in Jordan or Europe, receive warnings against involvement in press and media activities that oppose the regime.\(^{47}\) Other sources indicate that *al-Mukhabarat* even conducts drugs smuggling operations to neighboring Arab countries, including an illicit cigarette trade.\(^{48}\) Based in its past activities, *al-Mukhabarat* could conduct assassination operations or infiltration of Iraqi dissident groups in Turkey.

**MILITARY SECURITY [AL-AMN AL-’ASKARI]**

Initially constituted as part of the Special Bureau of the *Istikhabarat*, in 1992 Saddam established *al-Amn al-’Askari* as an independent entity reporting directly to the Presidential
Palace rather than military command or the Ministry of Defense. This unit was created after Saddam detected disturbances in the military. The head of Al-Amn al-Askari is Thabet Khalil al-Tikriti.

Al-Amn al-’Askari is responsible for 1) detecting and countering dissent in the Iraqi armed forces; 2) investigating corruption and embezzlement within the armed services; and 3) monitoring all formations and units in the armed forces. Al-Amn al-Askari monitors the Iraqi military and does not collect intelligence on foreign military threats, which is the responsibility of al-Istikhbarat.

THE AL-HADI PROJECT

The Al-Hadi Project is the organization responsible for collecting, processing, exploiting and disseminating signals, communications and electronic intelligence. Though it reports directly to the Office of the Presidential Palace, the intelligence it collects is passed on to other agencies for their utilization. Al-Hadi facilities operate around-the-clock, with five other ground collection stations located around Iraq.49

The organisation’s sophisticated computer equipment intercepts both domestic and international communications traffic. It monitors the military communications of other countries in the region, including communications between Operation Provide Comfort facilities at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, and the Provide Comfort Military Co-ordination Centre in Zakho, northern Iraq. Al Hadi also monitors communications of the Iraqi National Congress [INC], and the communications of the two main Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).50
A CASE STUDY OF IRAQI OPERATIVES AND OPERATIONS INSIDE OF TURKEY

In September 1998, Turkey and Iraq upgraded its relations on the ambassadorial level. In December 1998, Iraq sent Faruq Al-Hijazi as its ambassador to Ankara. However, he had no diplomatic credentials, and was associated with Iraqi intelligence service. Al-Hijazi is most known for his alleged meetings with al-Qa’ida in 1994 and again in 1998.

Al-Hijazi was an operative in the first Ba’th security apparatus, Jihaz Hanin. Afterwards he worked in al-Amn al-‘Aam and served as an al-Mukhabarat agent in several Iraqi embassies in Europe. In the latter role, he took part in managing the wide network of front companies and smuggling activities on behalf of the Iraqi government. During the 1990-1 occupation of Kuwait, Al-Hijazi’s duty was to provide security arrangements for intelligence activities.

According to another source, Al- Hijazi in his position in al-Mukhabarat, had provided support for the PKK. While al- Hijazi is no longer the ambassador to Turkey, the question of why would the Iraqi government send an al-Mukhabarat agent to serve in an ambassadorial capacity should raise suspicions.

A report released in March 2002, is indicative of a type of operation the Iraqi intelligence services would launch inside of Turkey. According to this report, “Information that leaked from official Turkish security sources indicated that the Turkish security apparatus has declared a state of emergency and is trying to track down and arrest Iraqi agents who entered Turkey in the past few days to pursue and assassinate American Intelligence members stationed at Turkey or in Iraq’s Kurdistan”. While the validity of these sources are difficult to corroborate, the information provided is substantiated by the past record and activities of Iraqi operatives abroad.

These sources claimed that the Iraqi agents entered Turkey with fake names and passports. Some of those passports are European and some are Asian and the agents fluently
speak the languages of the countries of which passports they are carrying. It was most likely these agents were trained by the *Mukhabarat* Office Sixteen, which conducts training of agents for clandestine operations abroad. Agents attend a special school near Baghdad which provide language courses and orientation concerning the country to which they will be assigned, as well as provides training for the operation itself.\(^{56}\)

According to this report, two among the names that had been identified by American Intelligence were described as highly dangerous. The Iraqi agents both carried Italian passports, with the first entering Turkey by air through Istanbul and the second entered Turkey by air through Ankara.\(^{57}\) It is most likely that the Special Bureau of the Mukhabarat issued the fake passports for this part of the mission.

Diplomatic sources in Ankara revealed that Iraq is responding to an American plan to send assassination teams to Baghdad. The Iraqi intelligence planned to use commando’s team with a goal of kidnapping or assassinating American Intelligence agents in Turkey.\(^{58}\) The unit that could have conducted such a mission would most likely be the “Turkish Battalion” of Unit 999 of the *Istikhbarat*’s Special Bureau.

**CONCLUSION**

The security apparatus that emerged as a small unit under the guidance of Saddam Hussein during the 1960s has emerged as a vast and complex network that has kept him in power by swiftly dealing with threats to his regime, both real or imagined. The system was created, expanded, controlled and managed by Saddam. Iraq’s intelligence and security network permeates every aspect of Iraqi life, ensuring his total control over the state. No organization, agency or military unit, nor even opposition groups outside of Iraq are ever secure from Saddam’s surveillance or free of penetration from his intelligence agencies. Thus, Turkey’s
position in a future US campaign against Iraq, would certainly make it a target of this security apparatus.

* Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International relations and Lecturer at the US Naval Postgraduate School. This article has been written before the U.S. military operation towards Iraq.

NOTES

1 To access their website go to: http://fas.harvard.edu/~irdp


4 Hiro, p. 56.

5 Makiya, p. 15.


7 Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security) is also known as Jihaz al-Amn al-Khas (The Special Security Apparatus).

8 Hiro, p. 55.


10 Hiro, p. 57.

11 Also referred to as al-Maktab al-Amn al-Qawmi (The National Security Bureau).


13 Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security) is also known as Mudiriyyat al-Amn al-Khas (The Special Security Directorate) or Jihaz al-Amn al-Khas (The Special Security Apparatus, The Special Security Organization or The Special Security Service). It is also referred to as Jihaz Mukhabarat al-Ra’isa (The Presidential Intelligence Apparatus, The Presidential Affairs Department or The Presidential Intelligence Bureau). In some publications it is abbreviated by the acronym, SS, SSS or SSO.


15 Ritter, p. 75.

16 Ritter, p. 102.
18 Boyne, July 1997, p. 314.
19 Unattributed article, “Fifteen Years Jail Sentence for Iraqi Intelligence Deputy Chief,” al-Zaman June 26, 2000, translated in FBIS.
20 It is also known as Mudiriyyat al-Amn al-’Amm (General Security Directorate or General Security Service) and also referred to as The Secret Police, and is sometimes written with the acronym GS or GSS.
21 Dilip Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars, p. 54.
22 Makiya, p. 12.
23 According to the Human Rights Watch publications, there also existed Emergency Forces prior to the 1991 Gulf War, under the control of the Ba’th Party.
24 Ritter, p. 122.
26 Hiro, p. 56.
28 Ibid.
29 Copley, p. 714.
30 Boyne, August 1997, p. 366.
31 Ibid.
33 Cordesman, p. 155
34 Makiya, p. 13.
35 It is also known as al-Mukhabarat al-Amma (General Intelligence), and is also referred to as Da’irat al-Mukhabarat al-’Amma (The General Intelligence Directorate, The General Intelligence Department, The General Intelligence Service or The Iraqi Intelligence Service). It is sometimes written with the acronym, IIS, GID or GIS.
36 Hiro, p. 56.
37 Ibid.
38 Boyne, August 1997, p. 365.
41 Boyne, p. 65.
42 www.fas.org
44 Hiro, p. 56.
45 Ali Abd al-Amir, “Plan to ‘Track Down’ Iraqi Oppositionists Put into Effect.”

Muhammad al-Salih, “Saddam Husayn is Trying to Revive his Media Empire Abroad,” *al-Ra’y al-Amm* (Kuwait in Arabic), November 12, 2000. Transcribed in FBIS.

Unattributed article, “Fifteen Years Jail Sentence for Iraqi Intelligence Deputy Chief.”

Boyne, August 1997, p. 367.

Ibid.


www.fas.org.


Ibid.