An Analysis of the Turkish-Greek Relations from Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other’ Perspective: Causes of Antagonism and Preconditions for Better Relationships

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Many would suggest that Turkish-Greek relations have entered on a new phase in recent years in the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, questions are being asked about how traditional and ingredient antagonisms along with clash of interests between two countries can be redefined to accommodate the causes of failures and what are the sorts of issues that need to be addressed as the preconditions for better relationships?

The contention of this paper is that there is no direct hostility or antagonisms between the two nations. Instead, identities has been shaped and constructed in accordance with regime benefits. Consequently, political culture and perceptions of states as understood in terms of norms, values and foreign policy orientations, proclaim expressive totality over identity since the society is subordinated to the state. Accordingly, Turkish-Greek antagonism rooted to the historical past and was shaped by the current implications compatible with the real world issues. Therefore it needs broad analysis differing from past to present. Departing from this statement, initially I should provide a brief overview of historical background and its contribution to the Turkish-Greek antagonism. The chronological structure and brief reference to history aims at retaining analytical cogency and descriptive relevancy as an explanation of what has come before and after. Since the scope is enormous and the space is limited, I emphasize on the
independence of Greece and post independence period along with its consequences and implications in Turkish-Greek relations. For this section, simply it would be put forward that Greeks contact with Europe through merchant facilities & Diaspora communities, and earlier inducement of capitalist mode of relations have changed Greek perceptions about Turks and strengthened their 'European' identity objectives that are at the core of the antagonism between two states.

Understanding Turkish-Greek relations requires a complex analysis that should connect the past to the present. By keeping this complexity in mind, in the next section I have tried to provide with a theoretical framework for analyzing the causes of antagonism from the perspective of Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other’ image identities. It is beneficial to stress that this paper will not present a detailed expression of internal issues and dynamics of the Turkish-Greek antagonism from the traditional military/geopolitical perspective. Instead, my concern and examination based on psychological, identical, and political aspects of the Turkish-Greek relations. Thus traditional conflicting issues such as Cyprus and Aegean Sea & Islands will be given only marginal emphasis. In this connection, lastly, I would like to remind to the reader that Turkish-Greek relations always remained as a sensitive issue in which national and ethnic character of both communities did not make it possible to be totally ‘objective’. Thus this analysis tended to not deeply involve in ‘sensitive’ political issues by regarding the academic nature of this paper. Furthermore, parameters of this research do not give room for the very detailed analysis of extensive and complex Turkish-Greek relations. Eventually, it become compulsory to be selective on what should be within the scope of this paper and what should be left out with reservation of the author.
Historical Background of Turkish-Greek Antagonism

Historical background is important for an analysis of the Turkish-Greek relations simply because not only does it widen the perspective of the essay but it also satisfies a better understanding and unearths empirical evidences. Although it is needless to say that rather than presenting and examining the historical events, in this section, my concern and focus will deal with psychological aspects of these events along with their contributions to the development of Turkish-Greek antagonism.

An initial note about Turkey and Greece is that both states have glorious past which they dominated the Eastern Mediterranean region militarily, politically and culturally, initially Greeks, through Byzantine Empire, and then Turks through the Ottoman Empire. Although neither Byzantine Empire nor the Ottoman Empire were completely formed by Greeks and Turks, their rulers and senior administrators were mainly Greek and Turkish origins. Needless to say that this distinct history also shaped the identity formations.

According to the historians, from the Fifth to the Seventh Century Greece was invaded by Goths, Huns, and Slavs, whose depredations destroyed urban life of the Greeks and brought Greek civilization to an end. In the late Eleventh Century, Greece again came under Western influence when Normans from Sicily invaded Greece. The Crusaders crossed Greece on their way to the Middle East and the Fourth Crusade was diverted to an attack on the Byzantine Empire in 1204. As a result of this attack, all of Greece, except the rugged interior, was occupied and divided into states ruled by Western princes or was controlled by the commercial republics of Venice and Genoa. This domination continued until the Ottoman Conquest in the Fifteenth Century, in which Greece remained under the Ottoman control for about four hundred years.
This short historical preview arguably demonstrates that Greek community was already frustrated by various powers that led the development of self-esteem, defense mechanism and normative principle of “Greeks should be ruled by Greeks”. Putting it differently, this psychological construct that depends on unreliability against the foreigners was not something special to the Turks or Ottomans. It was a natural result of painful experiences of the past. By keeping this assumption in mind, the fall of Greek’s holy city and capital (Istanbul/Constantinople) to Turks could be highlighted as initial historical antagonism against Turks. (1) This event has a deep psychological impact that as the Ottomans conquered Istanbul on Tuesday, that day considered as the unpropitious day of the week and remains unforgotten for Greeks even for today. (2)

Nevertheless, after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, Sultan (Conqueror) Mehmed the Second declared that Greek Orthodox Church would be free in its religious practices. As he appointed the Patriarch of Istanbul as the leader of the whole Orthodox millet (community) living in the Ottoman Empire. The millet system that is the main political organization towards the non-Muslims led grouping of the non-Muslim communities under their religious institutions. Since the Sharia (Muslim religious law) could not be applied to the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Since the Greek Orthodox Church had its own freedom, naturally, the Greek community was able to preserve its language, religion, and culture within the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, Greeks had a unique chance to create Greek local autonomy in the Balkan Peninsula. Thus, Greece separation from the Ottoman Empire as the first nation-state was not a phenomenon that happened by coincidence. Greeks were more motivated to acquire their independence than any other Balkan nation due to the freedom of the Greek Orthodox church that preserved Greek’s language religion, and culture along with keeping the memories alive of Greek glorious past.
Needless to say that freedom play a crucial role in the development of Greek self-consciousness especially in the Nineteenth Century following the French Revolution. Thus when the military and economic structures of the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate and decline, the French revolution influenced and contributed to the revolutionary spirit of the Greek War of Independence. The idea of the liberty and equality made impact on Greeks who were ready to turn back the ancient glories and liberties of old Greeks. Since Greece is a mountainous country with flat land restricted to many small coastal plains, Greeks increase their interactions with Europe through merchant facilities. At this point, arguably Greeks contact with Europe through merchant facilities and Diaspora communities played a crucial role on initial formation of psychological barriers between Turks and Greeks. For instance, Greek merchants carry the European ideas to the Ottoman Empire and convey European & Western drive for an "idealized reconstruction of the ancient Greek civilization" (3). Thus, through the establishment of Sovereign Greek state initial distinction between the inside (Greece) and outside (Ottomans) constructed for the confirmation of Greek institutional, cultural and territorial specificity.

Another important point at the formation of psychological antagonism between two entities is the comparatively early transition of Greece to the capitalist mode of production after its independence. Greece was more ready than any other Balkan state including Turkey for the transition to the capitalist mode of production and administration. Main reason behind this was Turkish disdainful attitude towards trade and merchant activities partly because of the religious and cultural reasons. This attitude paves the way of non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire to be in total control of trade within the Ottoman Empire. Greeks were not the exception. Especially Greek hegemony in merchant and maritime activities allow them to extend their operations through major European urban centers. Furthermore, the industrialization and
capitalization of the Britain in the second half of the Eighteenth Century directly influenced and shaped the newly born Greek state. Western capital, in the form of railway investments and government loans prepared the ground for the growth of industrial capitalism in Greece. To epitomize, all these modernization movements shaped the Greek economy and led the dominance of the capitalist mode of production especially towards the end of the Nineteenth Century.

Accordingly, there was a close consistency between Greece comparatively early inducement of capitalist mode of production and causes of psychological antagonism between Turks and Greeks. As Greeks increased their knowledge about European ideas through Diaspora communities and highly developed merchant activities, they started to develop their knowledge and experiences about real world issues. This improvement in their socio-economic life backed up by their traditionally alive culture that Greeks proud of. Consequently, Greeks started to feel superior both economically and intellectually from their Turkish counterparts and everything remained from the Ottoman Empire bound to erode within the pages of history. In other words, Greeks privileged ‘the West’ as representative of ‘progress’ where Ottoman Empire and Turks represented past, underdevelopment and traditionality. This construction also allows Greeks to justify their independence struggle against ‘imperial’ power and ‘uncivilized’ community.

Finally, comparatively early achievement of modernization of Greece helped to fill the space between theoretically constructed objectives and practical implications. For instance, after 1864, the first democratic Constitution had been publicized and the country witnessed the first major effort to modernize the economic, and administrative structure under the leadership of President Trikoupis. In this phase of rapid overall development, economic and administrative revolutions have been followed by the development of middle class, banking system and the
merchant navy. Evolutionary departure point of all these efforts was the New Greek Constitution of 1910 (during Venizelos Presidency) that individual liberties were guaranteed and the formulations of a state of law were laid. It was quite clear that governmental activities in all sectors confirmed country’s self-confidence and virtualization of identity distinction between Greeks and Turks in which its impacts even lasts for present times.

**The Emergence of Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other’ Image Identities**

Having mentioned the historical groundings of Turkish-Greek antagonism, it is now time to probe in greater detail the motivations behind the causes of antagonism that distinct the Greek ‘Self’ from the Turkish ‘Other’. In other words, in this section, merely, I will try to provide with theoretical framework for the construction of Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other’.

According to Toynbee, ‘every’ nation claimed to be modern, scientific and democratic. This is due to the socio-economic, scientific, and political successes achieved by the Western World that impressed the rest of the world. (4) Eventually to be Western represents to be rational, scientific, and superior at least by perception. Arguably the case of Greece was not an exception. Ambitions and motives to be rational, scientific, ‘progressive’, and Western led the construction of European Greek ‘Self’ against traditional, static Muslim, and irrational Turkish identity. There is little doubt that this construction had played an important role on the formation of antagonisms on Turkish-Greek relations. As Ottoman Empire started to decline starting from the Sixteenth Century, Turks lost their image of glorious and progressive power of the West. Instead, it is perceived as the representative of the traditional static World that has no place in ‘progressed’ Europe. From the economic point of view, this perception further maintained because Ottoman Empire was still depended on agriculture that represents traditionality while Western powers technologically advanced and diversified their economies. Additionally, it
should be stressed that the construction of Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other’ also formed in accordance with the hegemonic regime of global modernity that patriarchal Euro-centric identification mechanisms privileged the modern, male, rational, and Western subjects.

Another important point that should be stressed on the causes of Turkish-Greek antagonism is not only the construction of Self-Other image but also the putting ‘Other’ to a lower cultural space. In other words, in this antagonism, both sides objectives were to allocate the other to an inferior moral space by promoting itself to the superior morality. At this point, Vamik Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz put forward that Western and especially Greek and British diplomats, politicians, and writers tended to view that Greeks suffered under the rule of Turks who were nomads, uncivilized, and sadistic people. (5) Furthermore Ottoman Turks widely defined as filthy, lazy, and fanatical and were associated with duplicity, sensuality, and brutality. Eventually, Turkish ‘Other’ civilization constructed as an essentially religious, anti-rational, bureaucratic system lacked the necessary characteristics that had made European progress possible. In this connection, a corollary of this argument could be perceived within the words of famous Greek writer Nikos Kazantzakis:

To gain freedom first of all from the Turk, that was the initial step, after that, later, new struggle began: to gain freedom the inner Turk- from ignorance, malice and envy, from fear and laziness, from dazzling false ideas, and finally from idols, all of them, even the most revered and beloved. (6)

Thus, Greeks’ efforts to free themselves from the Ottoman Rule was not restricted to political freedom for the sake of independent nation and the country but also to re-create cultural and moral superiority. Consequently, while Greeks try to create moral and cultural superiority for the solidification of national unity and to hinder the socio-economic and political problems of
the newly established republic, inevitably, the seeds of antagonism for the next generations have been planted that impedes the way for closer relationships between two countries even today.

In the contemporary times, the clash between the Turkish ‘Other’ and Greek ‘Self’ take the form of clash between ‘European’ and ‘democratic’ identity versus non-democratic Turkish identity eager to intervene and resort to military force in any possible time. Theodore Couloumbis views this view as “since the 1960 military coup in Turkey, Turkish politics is under direct influence of the military especially on its foreign policy.” (7) Van Coufoudakis further suggests that many incidents are artificially created by Turkish media and exploited by Turkish administrators in order to enhance their political position at home as witnessed in Imia (Kardak) incident. (8) According to Coufoudakis, these incidents were done intentionally in order to keep Turkish military to focus on external problems rather than domestic politics. (9) Yannis Valinakis added that Turkey's intervention in Cyprus confirmed the fears of the Greeks that Turkey would not hesitate to use any military means to solve the Aegean question by referring to the Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974. (10) With the words of Fanny PaIIi Petralia Turkey represent a real threat to Aegean islands while Greece represents no threat to Asia Minor. (11)

**Current Sources of Antagonism and Implication of these on Greek ‘Self’ Turkish ‘Other’ Problematique**

One cannot deny the fact that geographical proximity and neighborhood between two nations for about 600 years played an important role in the emergence of current antagonism between two states. As Buzan defined regional security systems as "patterns of amity and enmity that are substantially confirmed within some particular geographical area." (14) Therefore, the current implications of Turkish-Greek antagonism along with clash of interest will likely to remain because of the two strategic actors that want to be influential within the same
geographical area. Main areas of competition between Greece and Turkey for today appeared as the competition for key position between the East and the West, to be influential in the Balkans and in the Middle East, attracting Western investments and eventually to be a dominant regional power. Arguably, at the core of all these competitions in the contemporary time, economic and political clash of interests play the main role. The situation worsens if one considers the fact that politics, economics, and foreign policy are three interrelated crucial concepts in both Greece and Turkey. Putting it differently, one shall remember that any study on Turkish-Greek relations politics should be approached as main concern behind this relationship is underpinned by the assumption that the political and economic concerns are inextricably intertwined with each other.

There is no need to stress that European Union membership has leveled up Greek economy and Greek society as it further shaped the European Greek ‘Self’ while distinguishing Turkish ‘Other’. Additional to its demographic weaknesses, Greek economy has been seriously injured during the Second World War and Greek Civil War (1946-1949) between Communists (EAM-ELAS) and Royalist armies EDES following the Second World War. Thus when Greece became the member of the European Union in 1981, as a comparatively poorer, less prosperous, and peripheral state of the European Union, community funds were crucial for Greek economy. For instance, financial aids from the European Union amounted to five percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 1992. In short, European Union membership satisfies both economic and political benefits as it serves confirmation of European identity. Thus it is quite natural that Greece carries the concern that in the case of its membership Turkey could have become the formidable competitor in attracting European Union investment and benefits that would have reduced Greece's benefits in both economic and political areas. In other words, Greece opposed full integration of Turkey into the modern European system because of the fear that civilized,
modernized, and economically advanced Turkey would be closer to Europe and compete for with Greece in the European Union. Furthermore, Volkan and Itzkowitz correctly pays attention to the point that if Turkey improved its economy, there would be nothing left to restrict Turkey to be a regional hegemon. (12)

To sum up, one more implication of Greek ‘Self’ Turkish ‘Other Problematique and vice versa plays a significant role at the core of current sources of antagonism between Greece and Turkey. In other words, the construction of image identities used to provide theoretical grounding for political justification of state’s foreign policies like within earlier periods. For contemporary time European Union membership provides the basis for Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other problematique. For instance, while Greek governments frequently emphasized the ‘non-European and Islamic character of Turkey’ in order to prevent Turkey’s European Union membership, (13) Christian and Western ‘identity’ of the that opposes Turkey’s European Union membership. In both cases the earlier construction of Self-Other image identities satisfies the continuous rationalization for the each party actions.

**Preconditions For Better Relationships**

It was the preoccupation of the military security concerns that dominated political thinking, strategies and even the foreign policies of the states till the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless after the Cold War there had been a shift in security concerns that traditional military security concerns stayed in the shadow of the new security concerns. These new security threats vary from immigration to environmental problems, from extension of trade areas to control of drug trafficking, AIDS etc that cannot be solved independently, and requires shared responsibility, and co-operation between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, both countries could ‘win’ from the closer partnership in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, accordingly, the
development of co-operation and mutual understanding between Turkey and Greece could also form a model for the regional co-operation in the Mediterranean as it would form a partnership between European and Mediterranean country on a mutually benefitable basis.

Then, since the better relationship is beneficiary for the both states what are the some preconditions for better relationships? This paper contention is to highlight upon certain important points that could contribute to the synthesis in which assumptions for better Turkish-Greek relationship could derive from.

As frequently emphasized profound construction of image identities impede the way for better relationships. Hence, initially, the denouncement of pre-constructed identities for the new construction is mandatory. In other words, both Turkey and Greece should modify their beliefs and political actions even this would contradict with their earlier actions and political traditions. In order to make this project possible, initially, Greeks shall secure themselves from the Turkish ‘obsession’ as militarily powerful belligerent side. Ottoman Empire could be perceived as expansionist like all other Great Empires who had controlled the Europe, Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This was quite natural simply because ex-Empires were originally organized for conquest, whose economies were depended on agriculture, land, manpower (including military purposes) and all kind of possessions gathered from the acquired lands. Moreover, although Turks are the main heirs of the Ottoman Empire, they are not the unique one since the Ottoman Empire was a cosmopolitan Empire including many ethnic groups. Thus, Turks cannot be blamed alone for all the actions that had done against Greeks in the past. Furthermore, as in the case of most important cause of antagonism between two nations, Turkish intervention in Cyprus, was a phenomenon that is open for all kind of interpretations with variety of justifications that cannot be count as empirical evidence for Turkish aggressiveness. Therefore,
pre-occupied mind that Turks has tradition of expansionist emotions shall abolish for the prospect of better Turkish-Greek relationships. It was equally clear that modern Turkish Republic that founded in 1923 has secularist and democratic tradition as a legacy of its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who has a vision of 'peace at home, peace in the world'. Hence, although most of Turkey’s territory geographically felt to the Asia and only partially to the Europe, its comparatively democratic, secular political structure and vision of European Union membership could help to the falsification of the constructed Orientalist-traditionalist image of Turkey.

Another suggestion has been put forward in this paper is the mutual ‘recognition’ of power and influence of both Greece and Turkey. For instance, Greece should respect Turkish influence in Central Asian Republics along with its special role between the East and the West. That is quite natural if one considers Turkey's geo-political location, cultural, religious, and historical bonds with the region. Likewise, Turkey should respect to the role of Greece in the Balkans as the most prosperous Orthodox nation. With exception of rich Western countries, both states are the most prosperous nation-states of their geographical area where Turkish and Greek origin minorities are living. Thus it is quite normal that both states defined their status as ‘protectorate’ of the minorities living in other regional countries. In other words, both states and nations have distinctive history, culture, and aspirations that do not necessarily form a clash of interest but a common point for collaboration for mutual interests. To epitomize, correspondence in character of state formations in terms of objective oriented establishments could form a ground for mutual understanding, and norms for better relationships.

Complementary to this view the denouncement of using external politics for domestic popularity is another important point. This means that neither Greece nor Turkey should use the Turkish-Greek hostility as an election campaign. Furthermore, political obsessions about
chronological issues shall be abandoned. For instance, would the extension of territorial sea and
the airspace in the Aegean Sea give any particular advantage to the Greece in terms of economic
and political beneficiaries? Similarly, what would be Turkey’s lost from the direct negotiations
with Greece on its ‘sensitive’ concerns such as Cyprus and Aegean Sea? In order to meet in
common ground, each party initially shall discredit the policy that ‘their’ interpretation of
politics and comments are absolutely correct.

In the same vein, a final note should reserve for the interpretation of the history and the
impact of those historically created values on Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other’ image identities.
According to Collingwood, there is a direct connection between the past and the present. (15)
Collingwood suggests that past ‘thoughts’ recovered in the present and thought has
‘repeatability’ character in its very nature. (16) Therefore, thought is outside of the time concept
and it is more than a simple event or situation that had happened once upon a time. As the arrival
point of these arguments Collingwood theorizes that ‘thoughts’ shaped the consciousness of the
individuals and connected them into a greater entity. In other words, as Collingwood wrote in his
autobiography, "Thought defines all individuals and binds them together into a larger, non-
temporal network… each act of thought in the past was already a repetition of something which
persists outside of all its concrete manifestations". (17)

Therefore, as Collingwood has emphasized it is at the hands of the politicians, historians,
and/or other influential authorities to recover or use that past thoughts in order to reach their
ends. Departing from this statement, unfortunately, as highlighted by Volkan and Itzkowitz, "the
technical, legal and political aspects of Turkish-Greek problems have been long forgotten, giving
way to a mythical, mystical confrontation laden with fear, animosity, and ‘psychological’
preoccupation." (18) Leo Strauss explained this as while historical events transmitted to later
generations there is no certainty whether the transformation was affected consciously and with foil clarity. (19) Such an outcome was inevitable considering the close relationship between the power and knowledge. As Foucault asserts, the knowledge is produced by single process that is neither objective nor natural. (20) In other words, knowledge is never unconditioned and the subject of knowledge is situated in and conditioned by a political and historical context and constrained to function with particular concepts and categories of knowledge. In other words, through the sovereignty of independent Greek state certain epistemological dispositions constructed knowledge that serves to further distinguish Turkish ‘Other’ identity. Predictable result of these practices was the equation of difference or otherness with threat or danger although this was not ingredient to the identity grounded in a bounded territorial state.

Thus, as Strauss points out that one must distinguish between the inherited knowledge that is the philosophic or scientific knowledge that taken over from former generations and independently acquired knowledge that is the philosophic or scientific knowledge that acquired through unbiased intercourse. (21) Such distinction is essential because during the time space, same cognitive status given to the inherited knowledge and independently acquired knowledge. Thus the philosophic or scientific knowledge that acquired through unbiased intercourse should be privileged for the sake of better Turkish-Greek relations.

Finally, the paper assumes that there are much more similarities between nationhood of two states that could be defined as the synthesis of Eastern and Western concept of nationhood. For instance, Hassner stated that “Eastern concept of nationhood” is an ethnic one that is based on common culture defined in terms of race, language, tradition or religion, while “Western concept nationhood” is relied on state, territory citizenship, and political principles. (22) Although Greece widely criticizes Turkey to be oriental society, the conditions that defined by
Pierre Hassner also exists in Greek society. The influence of religion on society and the similar foreign policy objectives further illustrates the point that in fact the images that Greece created for Turkish ‘Other’ is also rooted in Greek politics. For instance Coufoudakis, stated that Greece needs to be involved in the Balkans without leaving an open door for the involvement of Turkey while accusing Turkey to have aspirations of becoming regional hegemon and in the Balkans.

(23) Likewise, although Turkey has been criticized as being the guard for American interests, Mitsotakis as the rightist politician does not hesitate to offer that Greece is suitable for the same task. (24) Moreover, while Turkey has been criticized to be servant of United States, Greeks ignore the fact that it was the United States economic and political assistance and Greek-Americans that shaped the whole Greek economy of the 1967-1974 period. Similarly, although population of Turkey regarded as serious problem on European Union membership, many Greek politicians highlighted the point that Turkish population constitutes an 'element of power' and Greece has significant comparative disadvantage in this respect.

**Concluding Comments**

This short analysis has started with its assertion that the construction of Greek ‘Self’ and Turkish ‘Other’ identities plays a significant role on causes of antagonism between two nations. The historical construction of such distinction was necessary because since the society is subordinated to the state, new-formed Greek and Turkish states created their own histories by acting as a spatial organization. By this exclusion in moral terms, the legitimization of politico-military practices becomes easier which advance national security interests. Thus when founding antagonisms inherited from the Ottoman Empire and modified by the modern economic bargains, two states do not find any problem to continue traditional policies based upon the
competition and antagonism between two nations. Desire to be influential within the same geographical area further escalated this competition.

Nevertheless with the fundamental changes in the world politics in the post-Cold War era the door opened for the new relationships that required the re-construction of existent and prevailing identity problematique. In this new construction of ‘Other’s image, identity should suit well with the policy of both states. Thus both states should accept and respect the power and influence of each other in order to allow the co-operation for mutual benefits. In simplistic terms, Greece shall re-construct Turkish ‘traditionaist-orientalist’ perception and construct ‘new’ Turkish identity image that is European, modern and not belligerent along with accepting Turkey’s place in Europe.

As a last word, it should be noted that changing perception of Greece and de-construction of Turkish ‘Other’ will not be meaningful if Turkey is not determined to advance its vision in political, scientific, and economic terms and re-build structural adjustments on the way for European Union membership. Furthermore, the development of common norms for mutual understanding should not be left to the hands of the politicians and the diplomats. Civil societies and non-governmental organizations of both nations should contribute to this process for the breaking of prevailing constructions based on Greek ‘Self’ Turkish ‘Other’ and vice versa relationship.

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ENDNOTES

(1) Even today, many radio and TV news and programs in Greece and in Republic of Cyprus the name of Constantinople preferred to use instead of Istanbul.


(3) Ibid, 81.


(6) Ibid, 179.


(9) Ibid.

(10) Valinakis (Aliboni, 1992:54).


(13) Ibid.


(16) Ibid.

(17) Collingwood (1939).


(19) Strauss (1949).

(20) Foucault (1980).

(21) Strauss (1949).
(22) Hassner (1993:53).


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